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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT AS ApPLIED TO 
RICO CRIMINAL FORFEITURE-United States v. Busher, 817 F.2D 
1409 (9TH OR. 1987) 
INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organiza­
tions (RICO) statute 1 in October, 1970, as Title IX of the Organized 
Crime Control Act. 2 RICO provides for the total forfeiture of any 
property connected with a convicted defendant's racketeering activi­
ties. 3 The government used the RICO statute to seize the assets of 
Atlantic Construction Company, Inc. (ATL), a business owned by 
James Busher and his office secretary, Denise Miller.4. The forfeiture 
followed the convictions of Busher and Miller for twenty,.eight acts of 
mail fraud. S The acts of mail fraud constituted a violation of the 
RICO statute.6 
Atlantic Construction Company, Inc., together with its subsidi­
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & supp. IV 1986). 
This note is limited to a discussion of the criminal violation and forfeiture provisions 
contained in §§ 1961, 1962 and 1963. 
The civil provisions of RICO, contained in § 1964, allow any person to bring a civil 
suit for treble damages caused by a defendant's violation of §§ 1961 and 1962. See infra 
note 56 and accompanying text, distinguishing civil RICO from criminal RICO. 
2. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970). See H.R. REp. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 35, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4007, 4010. 
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. IV 1986). See infra note 81 for the text of the statute. 
4. Transcript at 1774-79, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. Haw. 1985) 
(testimony of James Busher). Busher owned 92% of Atlantic Construction Company, Inc. 
and Miller owned the remaining 8%. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. 
Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th CiT. 1987) (No. 85-1122). They founded the company in 1975 
and specialized in performing construction contracts for the Department of Defense. Id. 
The company was incorporated in Hawaii. Id. 
5. Busher and Miller were convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which concerns frauds 
and swindles conducted through the mails. See infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text 
for the text and discussion of the mail fraud statute. 
In addition to the RICO violations, Miller and Busher also were convicted of making 
false statements to the government, tax evasion, and mail fraud. Miller was sentenced to a 
two year suspended jail sentence and ordered to forfeit her interest in ATL and J. W. Con­
tracting. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 30, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84­
02445) (D. Haw. 1985). Miller did not appeal her forfeiture sentence. This note is limited 
to a discussion of Busher's RICO conviction and the total forfeiture of his interest in ATL 
and J.W. Contracting. 
6. United Sta.tes v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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ary, J.W. Contracting,7 was worth approximately $3,000,000.00 in 
1985,8 when Busher and Miller were ordered to forfeit the entire busi­
ness to the United States Govemment.9 The defendants' gain from 
their fraudulent conduct totaled $335,000.00, and involved only three 
of the fourteen construction contracts which they performed from 
1977 to 1983.10 However, the trial court jury found that the two com­
panies provided a source of influence over the defendants' racketeering 
activity. II Thus the total forfeiture of the defendants' three million 
dollar interest was mandated by the RICO statute. 12 
Busher appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming 
that forfeiture of his entire interest in the companies was so grossly 
disproportionate to his crimes that it violated the eighth amendment's 
prohibition against" 'excessive fines ... [and] cruel and unusual pun­
ishments.' "13 Without discussing any of the evidence from the trial 
court record, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Busher 
had made a "prima facie showing that the forfeiture may be exces­
sive."14 Observing that large forfeitures under RICO could result 
from trivial violations of the law, the court remanded the case and 
directed the district court to determine whether the forfeiture of 
Busher's property was so disproportionate that it violated the eighth 
amendment. IS 
To guide the district court's determination, the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals fashioned detailed eighth amendment guidelines 
7. In 1980, Busher established l.W. Contracting in Carson City, Nevada. The com­
pany never performed construction work. Rather, Busher used the company to carry out 
tax and contract fraud. Brieffor the United States, United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 
(9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1122) at 12, (citing Transcript at 1774-79, United States v. Busher 
(Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. Haw. 1985) at 1500-07, 1489-96, 1767). See text accompanying 
infra notes 154-59 for the discussion of Busher's use of l.W. Contracting in fraudulent 
schemes. 
8. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414. 
9. Id. The trial court ordered Busher to forfeit his entire 92% interest in ATL, plus . 
all of l.W. Contracting, and a house owned by l.W. Contracting in Nevada. Transcript of 
Sentencing Hearing at 24-25, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. Haw. 1985). 
10. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414; Appellant's Brief at 5, United States v. Busher, 817 
F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1122). 
11. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414. See infra notes 81-87 (explaining that forfeiture is 
mandatory upon conviction under RICO). 
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (criminal penalty for RICO violations requires total forfeiture). 
See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the RICO forfeiture pen­
alty and text of § 1963. 
13. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1412 (quoting U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII). 
14. Id. at 1415. 
15. Id. On remand, the district court determined that the forfeiture of Busher's as­
sets was not disproportionate and did not violate the eighth amendment. See supra note 
232. 
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from Supreme Court precedent. The appeals court relied heavily on 
Solem v. Helm,16 a case in which the Supreme Court determined that 
North Dakota's mandatory recidivist penalty of life in prison without 
a possibility for parole was disproportionate when imposed on a non­
violent repeat offender who was convicted of passing a worthless one 
hundred dollar check. 
This note evaluates the appropriateness of the detailed review 
which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals required for criminal RICO 
forfeiture ordersP Section I of this note presents an overview of 
RICO-a discussion of its origins and how its purpose has evolved to 
include the prevention and punishment of white-collar crimes.l s Sec­
tion II outlines the prosecutorial discretion which guards against 
abuse of the RICO statute, and explains how that statute operates­
what it sets out as necessary to prove a RICO violation, and what 
punishments and penalties the statute provides.l9 It also discusses the 
safeguards and remedies available to defendants convicted under the 
RICO forfeiture statute.20 Section III explains that while the Supreme 
Court has approved the congressional mandate of total forfeiture as a 
way to punish RICO defendants, there are continuing concerns that 
total forfeiture could produce disproportionate sentences.21 Section 
IV examines the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel and unu­
sual punishment, analyzes the standards for review of disproportional­
ity appeals set out in Solem, and concludes that the these standards 
may be properly applied by appellate courts to protect property as well 
as liberty rights. 22 
Section V examines the facts of Busher, which were not discussed 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and concludes that the court 
incorrectly applied the eighth amendment factors outlined in Solem to 
the Busher forfeiture appeal.23 Section VI explains the forfeiture pro­
visions of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act (DAPCA),24 
which parallel the forfeiture provisions of RICO. The Ninth Circuit 
16. 463 u.s. 277 (1983). 
17. See infra notes 180-232 and accompanying text. In addition to RICO forfeitures, 
this note also considers forfeitures under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act. See 
infra notes 234-70 and accompanying text. 
18. See infra notes 28-52 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 53-94 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 98-120 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 121-51 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 152-232 and accompanying text. 
24. 21 u.s.c. § 848 and 21 U.S.C. § 853. See infra notes 232-54 and accompanying 
text. 
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Court of Appeals has ordered district courts to conduct in depth 
eighth amendment review of DAPCA forfeiture sentences, and to con­
sider imposing partial forfeitures, while other courts have applied a 
more general eighth amendment analysis and enforced the total forfei­
ture provisions of DAPCA.2S Section VII explains how courts may 
insure that total forfeitures imposed under the RICO statute are pro­
portionate, in conformity with the eighth amendment. 26 This note 
concludes that the extensive judicial review and partial forfeitures pro­
posed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Busher could damage 
the effectiveness of criminal forfeiture statutes enacted by Congress, 
and can produce the disproportionate results which it seeks to 
prevent.27 
I. THE BROAD PURPOSE AND COVERAGE OF RICO 
A. Organized Crime: The Original Target 
Congress originally intended that the RICO statute require di­
vestiture of legitimate businesses which had become infiltrated and 
controlled by "the mob."28 However, in enacting the RICO statute, 
Congress attached a liberal construction clause which stated that its 
provisions "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur­
poses."29 The Supreme Court has recognized both RICO's liberal 
construction clause,30 and the significance of the Act's purpose, which 
is to eradicate organized crime "by providing enhanced sanctions and 
new remedies," including economic penalties, such as forfeiture of 
businesses and profits involved with racketeering.31 
25. See infra notes 255-70 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 271-95 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text. 
28. 116 CONGo REc. 592 (1970) (Remarks of Senator McClellan).
29. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452,.§ 904(a), 84 Stat. 
922-23, 947, (1970). This liberal construction clause is a congressional mandate which is 
considered "very rare in criminaIlaw." United States V. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1241-42 
(7th Cir. 1987) (affirming RICO conviction but remanding forfeiture order for further 
consideration). 
30. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983) (citing Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §904(a), 84 Stat. 922,947 (1970)); United States 
V. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1981).
31. Pub. L. No. 91-452 § 1,84 Stat. 922, 923 (1970). See Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588­
93 (affinning 20 year concurrent prison tenn and $20,000.00 fine). In Turkette, the court 
affinned a RICO conviction which was based on the defendant's use of a criminal organiza­
tion for racketeering. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that RICO applies only 
to infiltration of legitimate businesses. Id. See also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 
27 (1983) (affinning forfeiture of $340,000.00 in fire insurance payments by defendant in­
volved in an arson ring). "The Supreme Court's decision in Russello v. United States may 
represent the 'culmination of the judicial acceptance of prosecutors' efforts to transfonn 
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Today, the RICO sanctions may be imposed on any person who is 
convicted of investing in, acquiring control of, or conducting an enter­
prise through the use of money derived from a pattern of racketeering 
activity.32 The defendant need not be connected with La Cosa Nos­
tra33 or with "mobsters" in order to be convicted under RICO.34 The 
government now uses RICO to prosecute white-collar criminal de­
fendants who have no connection with the traditional racketeering ac­
tivity contemplated in the original RICO forfeiture statute. 35 
Moreover, a committee of the American Bar Association has recom­
mended that the term" 'racketeering activity' " be rem~ved from the 
RICO statute, and be replaced with the term" 'criminal activity.' "36 
The ABA Committee determined that the term "racketeer" may have 
a prejudicial effect on judges and juries, especially in cases of .. 'busi­
nessmen and politicians engaged in criminal conduct unrelated to 
RICO from a weapon against organized crime infiltration of legitimate business into a stat­
ute proscribing criminal organizations generally." Lynch, RICO: The Crime 0/ Being a 
Criminal. Parts I & 11,87 CoLUM. L. REv. 661, 707 (1987) (footnote omitted) (concluding 
that the Supreme Court was wrong to use legislative history in support of "sweeping inter­
pretations" of RICO). 
32. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985). 
33. La Cosa Nostra is "a secret national organization engaged in a wide range of 
racketeering activities, including murder, extortion, gambling and loansharking." United 
States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 1982) (affirming RICO and extortion 
convictions). 
34. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1025 (1984). The court, citing 116 Cong. Rec. 35,343 (1970), noted that RICO's 
legislative history "supports a rejection of this 'organized crime' element. During the 
House debates. . . an amendment that sought to limit the application of RICO to Mafia 
and La Cosa Nostra organizations ... was vigorously attacked" on the grounds that such 
an amendment would create "status offenses," such as those that the Supreme Court struck 
down in Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1962) and Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 
660 (1970). Moss, 719 F.2d at 21 n.17. But see Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling a/the 
Prosecutur's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 176 (1980) (absence of "organized crime" 
limitation undermines the rationale for severe RICO penalties, which could be justified by 
serious threat to society posed by organized crime). 
Despite the well-settled conclusion that RICO's jurisdiction covers any criminal enter­
prise involved in racketeering activity, commentators still recommend that all defendants 
argue that their particular enterprise is not within the realm of congressional intent or case 
law. 2 F.L. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI, DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE CoLLAR 
CRIMES, FEDERAL AND STATE § 38:8, at 474 (1984). 
35. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984) (forfeiture of dental 
practice by dentist who bribed police union leaders to obtain renewal of contract for dental 
and other services), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 
387 (2d Cir. 1979) (forfeiture of seven furniture and equipment rental companies by 
Harvard law graduate who used the corporations to overcharge hospitals for rentals), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). 
36. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, RICO CASES CoMM., A CoMPREHENSIVE 
PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RICO LEGISLATION AND LmGATION 18 (1985) 
(quoting ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, RICO CASES. CoMM., 1982 REPORT 2). 
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traditional notions of organized crime.' "37 This concern is justified, 
because RICO has become "a mainstay in prosecutions of white-collar 
offenders,"38 and "a powerful tool used to wage war on white-collar 
crime."39 
B. White-collar Crime40 and the RICO Forfeiture Penalty 
While the traditional notion of racketeering evokes images of ob­
vious and crude methods of crime,41 white-collar criminals use sophis­
ticated techniques to avoid detection and to exploit their victims over 
long periods of time.42 White-collar criminals pose a serious threat to 
society and the economy,43 and perpetrate enormous amounts offraud 
37. Id 
38. 2 F.L. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI, supra note 34, § 38:1, at 471 (1984). 
39. Weiner, Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. 
U.L. REv. 225, 226-27 (1981). 
40. White-collar crime is defined as: 
non violent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception by persons 
whose occupational status is entrepreneurial, professional or 'semi-professional 
and utilizing their special occupational skills and opportunities; also, non violent 
crime for financial gain utilizing deception and committed by anyone having 
special technical and professional knowledge of business and government, 
irrespective of the person's occupation. 
THE DICTIONARY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DATA TERMINOLOGY 215 (2d ed. 1981) (Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice). 
41. A. BEQUAI, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: A 20TH CENTURY CRISIS 13 (1978). 
Where the traditional felon uses brute force and crude tools, the white-collar 
criminal employs technology . . . and relies on the ignorance and greed of his 
victims. Naivete and concealment playa key role in the arsenal of a white-collar 
felon. His victims, many times, are not even aware that they have been "taken" 
or harmed. Force and threats, however, are not totally absent from white-collar 
crimes. Co 
Id. 
42. "White-collar criminals cultivate trust. They disarm the protections that have 
been enacted around property and economic transactions and steal freely. . . . Trust ex­
pands the time frame of victimization from the momentary encounter of a mugging, bur­
glary, or shoplifting to ongoing long-term opportunities for repeated victimization." S. 
SHAPIRO, WAYWARD CAPITALISTS 8 (1984). The defendant in Busher followed these text­
book methods of white-collar crime to steal large sums of money from the government. See 
text accompanying infra notes 152-66 for a description of Busher's crimes. 
43. Stephen S. Trott, sworn in as a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit on April 19, 1988, has observed that widespread fraud in legitimate busi­
ness undermines the foundation of our economic system. During his tenure as Associate 
Attorney General, Trott stated: 
The example of criminal enterprises, and also supposedly legitimate enterprises, 
routinely operating by means of kickbacks, bribes, persistent frauds, and other 
kinds of illegal conduct, is infectious. The attitude develops that, since "every­
body does it", [sic] it makes no sense for a small business or an individual to try to 
succeed solely by honest means. The result is widespread public cynicism, and an 
overall erosion of deterrence. 
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against the government.44 Yet, society and the white-collar offenders 
themselves have not viewed white-collar offenses as "criminal," and 
traditional procedures for defining and punishing white-collar crime 
have not deterred or punished such crime effectively.4s 
The expansion of RICO to cover white-collar crimes such as mail 
and securities fraud46 now provides an effective punishment where 
none existed before.47 Once convicted under RICO, the white-collar 
Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary. 99th Cong., 
1st Sess. 106, 133-34 (1985) (statement of Associate Attorney General Stephen S. Trott) 
[hereinafter Oversight on Civil RICO Suits]. See also BEQuAI, supra note 41, at 129-34, 
which notes that traditional organized crime families are making increasing use of the tools 
of white-collar crime. Bequai suggests that the traditional felon may be a dying species in a 
cashless society. And see Sutherland, White Collar Crime is Organized Crime, in CoRPO­
RATE AND GOVERNMENT DEVIANCE 49,51 (M. Ermann and R. Lundman eds. 1978). 
44. Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, supra note 43, at 411 (statement of the National 
Association of Attorneys General and National District Attorneys Association). 
45. Sutherland, supra note 43 at 50-53. As Professor Conklin observed in 1977, the 
courts traditionally have discriminated in favor of white-collar criminals: 
[T]he criminal justice system treats business offenders with leniency. Prosecution 
is uncommon, conviction is rare, and harsh sentences almost non-existent. At 
most, a businessman or corporation is fined; few individuals are imprisoned and 
those who are serve very short sentences. Many reasons exist for this leniency. 
The wealth and prestige of businessmen, their influence over the media, the trend 
toward more lenient punishment of all offenders, the complexity and invisibility 
. of many b~iness crimes . . . . 
J. CoNKLIN, ILLEGAL BUT NOT CRIMINAL: BUSINESS CRIME IN AMERICA 129 (977). 
"None of the official procedures used on businessmen for violations of the law has been 
very effective in rehabilitating them or in deterring other businessmen from similar behav­
ior." Sutherland, supra note 43 at 50. 
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)(B). See infra note 62 for text of statute . 
. 47. See supra note 45 for a sociologist's view of inadequate penalties for white-collar 
crime. "The penalty structure for the federal fraud statutes most commonly used against 
white collar offenses has historically been hopelessly inadequate, at least insofar as financial 
sanctions are concerned." Lynch, RICO: The Crime ofBeing a Criminal. Parts I & II, 87 
CoLUM. L. REv. 661, 752 (1987). However, in questioning the expanded coverage of 
RICO, Professor Lynch notes that white collar criminals were not the target of the original 
RICO legislation proposed by Senator Hruska in 1968: 
[T]his expansion would have been modest had the list of activities selected as 
"typical of organized crime" remained limited to such blue-collar offenses as drug 
dealing, gambling, and crimes of violence. But the Hruska bill already had in­
cluded fraud and bribery of federal officials. . .. [T]he effect of the changes was 
that any corporate executive who conducted the affairs of his business "through a 
pattern of" fraud ... would violate RICO. In short, the combination of expan­
sions of coverage had the effect-apparently unintended-of drastically increas­
ing the potential penalties facing many "white collar" criminals. 
Id. at 683-84 (footnote oInitted). See also Lynch, RICO: The Crime ofBeing a Criminal. 
Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 920, 921 (1987) (RICO used against "strikingly ordi­
nary criminal conspiracies"); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 299 n.21 
(1983). In criticizing the expansive use of RICO, the author states that "[i]t is ironic that a 
statute designed to protect 'the small or marginal businessman who is most easily subject to 
invasion by organized crime,' ... is now used to prosecute small or marginal businessmen." 
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defendant must foneit all assets connected with racketeering, whether 
those assets are invested in an illegal enterprise or in a legitimate busi­
ness.48 The forfeitable interest includes "all forms of real and personal 
property [involved in the racketeering activity], including profits and 
proceeds. "49 
The total forfeiture penalty mandated by RICO may appear to be 
harsh, especially when viewed in light of the lenient and ineffective 
punishments imposed on white-collar criminals in the past. so How­
ever, courts have come to understand RICO's forfeiture mechanism as 
"a more potent weapon than fines or prison terms" for the punishment 
of white-collar criminals.sl Congress also has come to recognize that 
the substantial economic penalty of forfeiture is more appropriate for 
white-collar criminals and that the forfeiture sentence saves taxpayers 
the cost of incarcerating non-violent offenders. S2 
Id. (quoting Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 
496 (1969». 
48. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981). 
49. Russellov. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 21 (1983). The defendant in Russel/o, 
who hired arsonists to bum his apartment and office building, sought to keep $340,000.00 
that he collected from his fire insurance company for the fire damage. The defendant paid 
an insurance adjuster $30,000.00 to inflate the fire insurance claim. Brief for the United 
States at 3-4, Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (No. 82-472). 
Congress codified the Russello holding in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, enacted 
as Chapter III of the Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2040, 2192. 
The Act added a third paragraph to 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) which provides for forfeiture of 
any property derived from racketeering activities. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1988). 
See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 199, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3182,3380-82. See infra notes 81 (text of 18 U.S.C. § 1963), and 102 (ex­
plaining the amendment of § 1963 by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, which allows 
forfeiture of substitute assets). 
See also United States V. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.) (RICO conviction of 
wealthy Texas businessman and leader of "Cowboy Mafia" for drug and bank fraud viola­
tions), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). In 
Cauble, a RICO defendant forfeited to the government his one-third ownership in "a vast 
Texas business enterprise worth over 80,000,000 dollars ... [including] a one-third interest 
in over 10,000 acres of Texas real estate, substantial ownership of three Texas banks, ma­
jority ownership of several Texas corporations, and over 450,000 shares of blue chip stock." 
Reed & Gill, RICO Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests," and Procedural Due Process, 62 
N.C.L. REV. 57, 57 (1983). 
50. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing lenient punishment tra­
ditionally imposed on white-collar criminals) and infra notes 103-04 and accompanying 
text (discussing the decisions by the Supreme Court that have affirmed the forfeiture provi­
sions of RICO). . 
51. United States V. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1082 (1986) (quoting United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846,857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
464 U.S. 825 (1983». 
52. Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings on H.R. 2646 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, 
97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 150-51 (1981 & 1982) (remarks of Representative Sawyer). 
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II. THE RICO FORFEITURE MECHANISM 
A. Prosecutorial Discretion 
To prosecute a RICO forfeiture case, the government must first 
obtain "a grand jury indictment specifying the extent of the interest or 
property to be forfeited •.••"53 Any potential RICO prosecution is 
reviewed by the Justice Department in Washington, D.C., and is ap­
proved only if the indictment would yield a necessary or appropriate 
sentence in relation to the defendant's criminal conduct, and only 
when forfeiture will be proportionate to the underlying criminal con­
duct. 54 Although the Justice Department guidelines "give little pre­
"Those convicted after arrest for white-cOllar crimes were much less likely to be sentenced 
to incarceration for more than a year (18%) than were violent offenders (39%) or property 
offenders (26%)." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
TRACKING OFFENDERS: WHITE-COLLAR CRIME I (1986). See also Lynch, RICO: The 
Crime ofBeing a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 81 CoLUM. L. REv. 921, 919 (1981). In survey­
ing 236 RICO indictments, Professor Lynch determined that "RICO has been valuable in a 
large number of cases, principally in the areas of white-collar crime and labor racketeering, 
because it permits the expansion of penalties beyond those normally available for crimes 
such as mai1.fraud ...." Id. 
53. RICO CASES CoMM., A Comprehensive Perspective on Civil and Criminal RICO 
Legislation and Litigation, A.B.A. CRIM. JUSTICE SEC. REp. 84 (1985) (citing FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 1(c)(2) which states that "[n]o judgement of forfeiture may be entered in a crimi­
nal proceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the inter­
est of property subject to forfeiture." Id.) [hereinafter RICO CASES CoMM]. 
54. ORGANIZED CRIME AND RACKETEERING SECTION, CRIMINAL DIVISION, 
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RACKETEER INFLUENCED AND CoRRUPT ORGANI­
ZATIONS (RICO): A MANUAL FOR FEDERAL PROSECUTORS 106-07 (1986). This manual 
states that: 
Injudicious use of the [RICO] statute would reduce its impact in cases where its 
use is truly warranted. For this reason, it is the policy of the Criminal Division 
that RICO be selectively and uniformly used. In order to ensure that the statute 
is being used uniformly, all RICO criminal and civil actions brought by the fed­
eral government must receive prior approval from the Organized Crime and 
Racketeering Section in Washington, D.C., in accordance with the approval 
guidelines at Section 9-110.100, et seq., of the United States Attorneys' Manual. 
Not every case that meets the technical requirements of a RICO violation 
will be authorized for prosecution. For example, a RICO count should not be 
added to a routine mail or wire fraud indictment unless there is a special reason for 
doing so. RICO should only be invoked in those cases where it meets a special 
need or serves a special purpose that would not be met by prosecution on only the 
underlying charges. 
Id. (emphasis added). See also UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES AT­
TORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110.310 (1984), stating that RICO indictments should be sought 
only if the charges: 
A. Are necessary to ensure that the indictment: 
(1) adequately reflects the nature and extent of the criminal conduct involved; 
and 
(2) provides the basis for an appropriate sentence under all the circumstances of 
the case; or 
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cise guidance on selecting cases for RICO treatment," one 
commentator who studied 236 RICO indictments found no pattern of 
abuse of the statute. 55 Justice Marshall emphasized the importance of 
the Justice Department's discretionary process administered by the 
Justice Department when he stated: 
Congress was well aware of the restraining influence of 
prosecutorial discretion when it enacted criminal RICO provisions. 
It chose to confer broad statutory authority on the Executive fully 
expecting that this authority would be used only in cases in which 
its use was warranted. . . . [T]he government stressed that no 'ex­
treme cases' would be brought [under RICO) because the Justice 
Department would exercise 'sound discretion' through a centralized 
review process. 56 
The Justice Department guidelines state specifically that they do not 
B. Are necessary for a successful prosecution of the government's case against 
the defendant or a co-defendant; or 
C. Provide a reasonable expectation of forfeiture which is proportionate to the 
underlying criminal conduct. 
Id., quoted in Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, supra note 43, at 144. 
Despite the broad statutory language of RICO and the legislative intent that the 
statute "shall be liberally construed to effectuate it [sic] remedial purpose," it is 
the policy of the Criminal Division that RICO be selectively and uniformly used. 
It is the purpose of these guidelines to make it clear that not every case in which 
technically the elements of a RICO violation exist, will result in the approval of a 
RICO charge. Further, it is not the policy of the Criminal Division to-approve 
"imaginative" prosecutions under RICO which are far afield from the Congres­
sional purpose of the RICO statute. 
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-110.200 
(1984), quoted in Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, supra note 43, at 143. "The combination 
of prosecutorial discretion, trial court supervision of the evidence, and special jury verdict 
decision-making should continue to guard against disproportionate forfeitures." Weiner, 
Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1981 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 
225,234 (1981) (discounting the need for eighth amendment review of RICO forfeitures). 
55. Lynch, supra note 52, at 979. "Most of the RICO cases we have examined in­
volve serious, repeated misconduct. . .. [T]he pattern of actual use of the statute reveals 
that RICO is invoked most commonly in a few, rather easily defined settings, in each of 
which it is strongly arguable that previously existing federal criminal statutes are inade­
quate." Id. 
56. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 503-04 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis­
senting) (citations omitted). In Sedima, the Supreme Court majority ruled that a civiljudg­
ment can be obtained against a defendant, even if the defendant has not been convicted of a 
RICO criminal violation. In distinguishing criminal RICO from civil RICO, Justice Mar­
shall noted that'in civil RICO "the restraining influence of prosecutors is completely ab­
sent." Id. at 504 (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a discussion of civil RICO, see Oversight on 
Civil Rico Suits. Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
See also M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR CRIME ... A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR THE CORPORATE COUNSELOR (1986). 
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create substantive or procedural rights enforceable at law.57 Defend­
ants have been unsuccessful in using alleged violations of the guide­
lines as a basis for dismissing RICO indictments.58 However, 
defendants may seek mitigation or remission of forfeiture orders,59 or 
appeal disproportionate RICO forfeiture convictions on grounds that 
the government has not met the statutory requirements established by 
Congress.60 
B. Section 1961: The Threshold Statute 
To order a RICO forfeiture, a court must first convict the defend­
ant of at least two crimes which comprise a pattern of racketeering 
activity under 18 U.S.c. section 1961.61 In order to satisfy the "pat­
tern" requirement,62 the government must prove that the defendant 
57. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1411-12 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting 
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 1-1.100 
(1984». 
58. Claiming that the procedures outlined in the Justice Department manual were 
not followed, Busher argued that the trial court should have used its supervisory power to 
dismiss the RICO charges. Appellant's Brief at 10, United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 
(9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1122). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argument. 
Busher, 817 F.2d at 1411-12. 
59. See infra note 97 and accompanying text (explaining procedures for seeking relief 
from forfeiture). 
60. See infra notes 61-87 and accompanying text (explaining the statutory require­
ments for obtaining a RICO forfeiture), and infra notes 271-95 and accompanying text 
(outlining proper procedure for judicial review of RICO forfeiture appeals). 
61. The RICO statute defines "racketeering activity" in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1)(A) & 
(B) (Supp. IV 1986). Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) "racketeering activity" is defined as: 
any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, brib­
ery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in narcotic or other danger­
ous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment 
for more than one year. 
Id. Alternatively, racketeering activity under § 196I(1)(B) (Supp. IV 1986) includes viola­
tions of specific federal statutes relating to bribery, counterfeiting, theft from interstate 
shipment, embezzlement from pension and welfare funds, extortionate credit transactions, 
transmission of gambling information, mail fraud, wire fraud, obscene matter, obstruction 
of justice, obstruction of criminal investigations, and violations of other statutes. Id. 
18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" as requiring "at 
least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this 
chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprison­
ment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity." Id. 
62. In Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1984), the Supreme 
Court noted that the language of 18 U.S.c. § 3575(e) of the Organized Crime Control Act 
may be useful in defining "a pattern." Section 3575(e) states that "criminal conduct forms 
a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, par­
ticipants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguish­
ing characteristics and are not isolated events." 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1982), repealed by 
Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, §§ 212(a)(I), (2), 235(a)(I), 98 Stat. 1987, 
2031 (1984). Future reliance upon quoted language should be by citation to case. 
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committed at least two related, but distinct, predicate acts.63 
The court must consider the continuity of these predicate acts, 
and their relationship to one another, in order to determine whether a 
pattern of racketeering activity existed.64 Courts have interpreted the 
section 1961 predicate acts requirement liberally,65 usually rejecting a 
63. See United States v. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1050 (5th Cir. 1981) (pattern of rack­
eteering activity consists of at least two predicate crimes), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); 
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.) (the two predicate crimes need 
not be related to each other, but must be related to the affairs of the racketeering enter­
prise), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); cf infra note 265 (United States V. Ruggiero, 726 
F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir. 1984); United States V. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 396 (5th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982». See also United States V. Frumento, 409 F. Supp. 136, 
139 n.l (B.D. Pa. 1976) (pattern element requires proof of at least two separate instances of 
racketeering activity, and double jeopardy clause of U.S. Constitution did not require dis­
missal of tax fraud indictment because defendants were acquitted of state charges based on 
same alleged acts), aff'd, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1072 (1978); 
United States V. Friedman, 635 F. Supp. 782, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (two alleged bribe pay­
ments to others involved in city parking bureau conspiracy sufficient to sustain RICO in­
dictment); United States V. Freshie Co., 639 F. Supp. 442, 445 (B.D. Pa. 1986) (mail fraud, 
obstruction of justice, and bribes "sufficiently connected, but also sufficiently distinct" to 
constitute a pattern). . 
64. United States V. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1987). In Horak, the 
defendant was convicted of 37 counts of mail fraud in a bribery scheme to obtain a city 
garbage collection contract. In affirming the defendant's RICO conviction, the court 
stated: 
The statutory definition of the pattern element requires at least two acts of racke­
teering activity within ten years, but two acts do not necessarily fulfill the pattern 
requirement. . . . The Sedima Court concluded that the legislative history of 
RICO indicates that a confluence of "continuity plus relationship" between or 
among the predicate acts establishes the requisite pattern. . . . This court recog­
nizes the need· to evaluate the facts of each case individually in order to balance 
properly the two prongs of continuity and relationship. 
Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. V. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985); Marshall & Ilsley 
Trust CO. V. Pate, 819 Fo2d 806,809-10 (7th Cir. 1987); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 
F.2d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1986». 
65. See, e.g., United States V. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 950 (8th Cir.) (arson of church 
and house by white supremacist group established pattern even though the acts only bol­
stered the group's morale without providing financial gain), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 415 
(1986); United States V. Manzella, 782 F.2d 533, 537 (5th Cir.) (meetings at which defend­
ant asked co-defendant to burn his ex-wife's car and restaurant were predicate acts consti­
tuting a pattern of racketeering activity), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, reh'g denied, 790 F.2d 
1260 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Tripp, 782 F.2d 38,42-43 (6th Cir.) (rigged poker 
games violated state gambling statutes and constituted predicate acts), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1128 (1986); United States V. Welch, 656 F.2d 1039, 1050-52 (5th Cir. 1981) (conspir­
acy to obstruct enforcement of state gambling laws properly categorized as predicate acts), 
reh'g denied, 663 F.2d 101, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v. Castellano, 
610 F. Supp. 1359, 1424-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (marijuana is a "dangerous thing" within 
§ 1961(1)(a) provision defining racketeering activity to include dealing in narcotic or other 
dangerous drugs); United States V. Perkins, 596 F. Supp. 528, 531 (E.D. Pa.) (gratuities 
given to public officials in bid rigging scheme constituted predicate offenses), aff'd, 749 
F.2d 28, 29 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015 (1985). See also Tarlow, RICO 
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defendant's attack on the validity of the indicted offense. 66 
In Busher, the section 1961 predicate acts were mail fraud viola­
tions.67 The government charged Busher with violating RICO be­
cause he mailed false payment claims to the Department of Defense, 
and mailed falsified income tax returns to the Internal Revenue Ser­
vice. In his appeal, Busher argued that Congress "did not intend the 
filing of an income tax return to be a predicate act of racketeering 
activity,"68 and that the government made "inappropriate use of 
RICO in a simple fraud case."69 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
properly rejected that argument, reasoning that" 'any act which is 
indictable under' 18 U.S.C. section 1341 may serve as a predicate act 
for purposes of RICO."70 
Revisited, 17 GA. L. REv. 291, 346-356 (1983) (pattern requirement is a "nebulous 
concept"). 
66. M. PICKHOLZ, S.: HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 56, at 100. See also 2 F.L. 
BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI, supra note 34, § 38:4 at 472·73. 
67. Busher was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1341, which states that: 
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, 
or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, ... 
places in any post office ... any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered 
by the Postal Service ... shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not 
more than five years or both. 
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). "One reason Federal prosecutors tum to the [mail fraud] statute 
so often is because the mails frequently are used in criminal activity and, even more to the 
point, there are few Federal statutes regarding fraud outside the Federal Government other 
than the mail fraudmeasure... N.Y.Times.Nov.13.1987.at 21, col. 1. However, in 
McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987), the Supreme Court narrowed the reach 
of § 1341, holding that it "clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangi. 
ble right of the citizenry to good government." Id. at 2879. The Court concluded that, 
"[r]ather than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous 
and involves the Federal Government in setting standards of disclosure and good govern· 
ment for local and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the protection of 
property rights." Id. at 2881. See United States v. Mandell, 672 F. Supp. 864, 876-79 (D. 
Md. 1987) (vacating RICO convictions and forfeiture sentences and ordering government 
to repay fines paid by the defendants). The McNally decision is distinguishable from 
Busher, because Busher's frauds do not involve government corruption. See supra note 54 
for a discussion of the Justice Department manual stating that "a RICO count should not 
be added to a routine mail or wire fraud indictment unless there is a special reason for 
doing so." 
68. Transcript at 1643, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84-(2445) (D. Haw. 1985) 
(statement of Attorney George Mendelson). 
69. Appellant's Brief at 12, United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(No. 85.1122). 
70. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1412 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1961 (1982». "We have previously held that mailing fraudulent tax returns is indictable 
as mail fraud under Section 1341. . .. It follows that such violations can serve as predicate 
acts of racketeering under RICO." Id. (citation omitted). 
Courts have upheld each act of mail fraud as separate violations, even though there is 
only one scheme to defraud. United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d 595, 601-02 (7th 
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c. Section 1962: Substantive Prohibitions ofRICO 
The prosecution must next prove that the defendant used the 
"pattern of ra~keteering" to either invest in, participate in, control, 
acquire or conduct any enterprise.71 Section 1962 makes it illegal for 
the member of any enterprise to use or profit from the enterprise's 
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity.72 An "enterprise" 
Cir. 1978). "[E]ach mailing in furtherance of a scheme to defraud is a separate offense 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 even if there is but one scheme involved." Id. at 602. United 
States v. Beatty. 587 F. Supp. 1325. 1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (each of 14 acts of mail fraud 
was a racketeering activity. in sum constituting a pattern of racketeering activity). 




(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived. 
directly or indirectly. from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection 
of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest. directly or indirectly. any part of such 
income. or the proceeds of such income. in acquisition of any interest in. or the 
establishment or operation of. any en~erprise which is engaged in. or the activities 
of which affect. interstate or foreign commerce .... 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity 
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain. directly or indi­
rectly. any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in. or the 
activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. 
(c) It shall be unlawful for .any person employed by or associated with any en­
terprise engaged in. or the activities of which affect. interstate or foreign com­
merce. to conduct or participate. directly or indirectly. in the conduct of such 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or coilection of un­
lawful debt. 
Id. See Note. Jury Instructions/or Civil and Criminal RICO Cases with Commentary. 1987 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1. See also United States v. Phillips. 664 F.2d 971. 1011 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(merely engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity does not violate RICO; "gravamen of 
... [an] offense is the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity"). 
cert. denied. 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). 
72. 2 F.L. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATI. supra note 34. § 38:12. at 476 (1984) (sug­
gesting that the defense lawyer argue that the racketeering activities did not involve the 
enterprise and benefitted only the defendant individually). See, e.g.• United States v. 
Pecora, 798 F.2d 614. 625 (3d Cir. 1986) (illegal payments made to union officials formed 
predicate act and constituted conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 949 (1987); United States v. Russo. 796 F.2d 1443. 1462 
(11 th Cir. 1986) (not every defendant participated in every drug smuggling venture, but 
there was continuity to establish an enterprise conspiracy); United States v. Marrone. 746 
F.2d 957. 958-59 (3d Cir. 1984) (a RICO enterprise may involve a lone individual who 
commits related acts. unlike a traditional conspiracy offense); United States v. Gonzales. 
620 F. Supp. 1143, 1145 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("F.B.I. payments can constitute income derived 
from a pattern of racketeering activity so long as the payor ha[s] the intention or under­
standing specified in ... [state bribery statute]"); United States v. Perkins. 596 F. Supp. 
528. 530 (E.D. Pa.) (group of corporations set up by defendant to circumvent government 
bidding procedures by creating appearance of separate and independent vendors consti­
tuted an enterprise). aff'd. 749 F.2d 828-29 (3d Cir. 1984). cert. denied. 471 U.S. 1015 
(1985). See also M. PICKHOLZ. S. HORN & J. SIMON. supra note 56 at 98. And see Tarlow. 
supra note 65 at 324-46 (pattern requirement is a "nebulous concept"). 
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can be a group of persons associated with various corporations,73 a 
group of persons with no fonnal association other than the shared pur­
pose to engage in racketeering activity,74 or even governmental units 
such as courts and sheriffs' departments.7s 
The affairs of the enterprise must be related to the defendant's 
predicate acts.76 To establish this relationship between racketeering 
acts and affairs of the enterprise, the government must show that the 
defendant used his or her position or relationship with the enterprise 
to commit the predicate acts, and that the acts had some effect on the 
enterprise.77 
73. United States v. Tbevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 137-38 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 
F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 671 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.)~ cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008,458 
'U.S. 1109, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). 
74. See United States v. Dickens, 695 F.2d 765, 773 (3d Cir. 1982) ("enterprise" 
proven by defendants' common purpose of engaging in the racketeering acts sponsored by 
their religious sect), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1092 (1983); United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 
1193, 1198-1201 (8th Cir. 1982) (shared arson scheme linked insurance adjustor and others 
and was sufficient to satisfy enterprise requirement), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1110 (1983); 
United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 992-93 (3d Cir.) ("association formed for ... 
sole purpose of illegal racketeering can satisfy ... 'enterprise' requirement"), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 899 (1980). See supra note 31 for a discussion of United States v. Turkette, 452 
U.S. 576, 589-92 (1981) (holding that the enterprise may be a legal entity or a criminal 
organization). 
75. United States v. Blackwood, 768 F.2d 131, 137 (7th Cir.) (Cook County Circuit 
Court qualified as "enterprise" in case of court officer charged with taking bribes to intlu­
ence judicial decisions), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020 (1985); United States v. Welch, 656 
F.2d 1039, 1050-51 (5th Cir. 1981) (activities of a sheriff's office conducted through a pat­
tern of racketeering satisfies enterprise requirement), reh'g denied, 663 F.2d 101, cert. de­
nied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982); United States v. Brennan, 629 F. Supp. 283, 295 (E.D.N.Y.) 
(Supreme Court in Queens, New York was RICO enterprise when used by judge to accept 
bribes since enterprise need only be an organization, and not a criminal organization), 
aff'd, 798 F.2d 581 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Kaye, 586 F. Supp. 1395, 1400 (N.D. 
Ill. 1984) (court baililf was "associated with" circuit court, which was an "enterprise"). 
See also supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (explaining that both legal and criminal 
enterprises are subject to RICO prosecution). But see Lynch, supra note 52, at 982 (sug­
gesting RICO be amended and limited to prohibition of membership in criminal 
organizations). 
76. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1011 (5th Cir. 1981) ("two predicate 
crimes need not be related to each other but must be related to the affairs of the enter­
prise"), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). See also United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 
367, 402-03 (5th Cir.) (an arson and two acts of mail fraud were sufficient evidence of 
predicate crimes related to the affairs of enterprise engaged in arson with intent to defraud 
insurance companies), reconsidered in part, 650 F.2d 651 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 
U.S. 943, reh'g, 681 F.2d 952 (1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 16 (1983); United States v. Elliott, 
571 F.2d 880, 899 n.23 (5th Cir.) ("two or more predicate ... [acts] must be related to the 
... enterprise but need not ... be related to each other"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978). 
77. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330-33, 1342 (5th Cir.) (rejecting ap­
peal of RICO conviction and forfeiture, and rejecting argument that defendant failed to 
gain income from his pattern of racketeering), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984) (see supra note 49 for a discussion of Cauble); United 
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In Busher, the jury convicted the defendant of conducting his 
business enterprise through .a pattern of racketeering activity which 
was comprised of a series of mail frauds. 78 The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not disturb Busher's conviction. 79 
D. Section 1963: Penalty and Punishment Provisions ofRICO 
After convicting the defendant under section 1962, the court is . , 
ready to consider the penalty provisions of RICO.80 Under 18 U.S.C. 
section 1963, Congress mandated both traditional penalties of prison, 
and/or fines, and mandatory forfeiture of all "interests" in a racke­
teering enterprise, including forfeiture of any profits from the racke­
teering activity.8! While the statute leaves the imposition of a prison 
sentence and fines to the court's discretion, the forfeiture is mandatory 
States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1239-40 (7th Cir. 1987). The Horak court affirmed the 
conviction of a defendant who used his position in a corporation to commit racketeering 
acts which were related to, and had an effect, on the parent corporation. Id. See also 
United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 394 (5th Cir.), reconsidered in part 650 F.2d 651 
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943, reh'g, 681 F.2d 952 (1982), aff'd, 464 U.S. 16 
(1983). The Martino court listed five elements for a substantive RICO conviction under 
§ 1962: "(I) the existence of the enterprise; (2) that the enterprise affected interstate com­
merce; (3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that he 
participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that he partiCipated 
through a pattern of racketeering activity." Id. at 394. 
78. Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order at 1-2, United States v. Busher, 
(Cr. No. 84-02445-01) (D. Haw. 1985), citing Count 2, Indictment, United States v. Busher 
(Cr. No. 84-02445). 
79. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming conviction but 
remanding for review of forfeiture finding). 
80. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1348. The Cauble court recommended that a judge wait 
until the jury has decided whether a defendant is guilty of a pattern of racketeering activity 
under § 1962 b,.efore presenting the § 1963 instructions for a special verdict on the forfeiture 
issue: 
To ease the jurors'task in determining guilt or innocence, the forfeiture issue 
should be withheld from them until after they have returned a general verdict. At 
that time the trial judge can instruct the jurors fully about forfeiture and submit 
the special verdict to them. Such a bifurcated trial-using, of course, only one 
jury-is not only convenient for the judge and fairer to the defendant. It also 
prevents the potential penalty of forfeiture from influencing the jurors' delibera­
tions about gUilt or innocence. 
Id. "[T]he forfeiture order is part of the determination of [the defendant's] ... sentence 
rather than a finding of his guilt or innocence." United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 
1246 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(en banc) ("RICO forfeiture is a punishment imposed on a guilty defendant."), cert. denied, 
475 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 87-88 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983». 
81. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (Supp. IV 1986) states that: 
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be fined 
not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both, and 
shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of State law­
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upon conviction. 82 
To impose this forfeiture sentence, the trial court jury must find a 
nexus between the defendant's property and the defendant's criminal 
activity.83 The statute does not permit the jury to differentiate be­
tween those parts of a RICO enterprise engaged in racketeering activ­
ity and those that are not. Under the statutory scheme, it does not 
matter that some assets of the enterprise were not ,"tainted," or not 
used to carry out the "racketeering activity."84 The defendant's inter­
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of section 
1962; 
(2) any­
(A) 	 interest in; 
(B) 	 security of; 
(C) 	 claim against; or 
(D) 	 property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influ­
ence over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, 
controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of 
section 1962; and 
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the person 
obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful debt collec­
tion in violation of section 1962. 
82. "Under current federal law, it is generally thOUght that the criminal forfeitures of 
RICO are mandatory." RICO CASES CoMM., supra note 53, at 93 (citations. omitted). As 
the trial judge in United States v. Busher told the defendant, "[T)his court has no choice in 
the matter [of the total forfeiture]." Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 24, United States 
v. Busher (Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. Haw. 1985). 
83. See United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387,395 (2d Cir. 1979) (forfeiture sustained 
because defendants' "seven entities ... were all in the hospital supply business, and that 
business was conducted through a series of mail frauds"), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); 
see also United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461, 1477 (9th Cir. 1986) (remanded on 
other grounds, but sustaining forfeiture because the government established that the for­
feited properties were acquired or maintained with racketeering enterprises' funds, and 
were "an interest of the enterprise even though legal title was in the defendant himself or a 
nominee"). Cf United States v. Nerone, 563 F.2d 836, 852 (7th Cir. 1977) (vacating forfei­
ture of trailer park owned by defendants charged with running an illegal gambling opera­
tion in a single house trailer "because of a total want of proof of the connection between the 
racketeering activities and the affairs" ofthe trailer park), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978); 
United States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (nexus required between 
racketeering activity and assets to be forfeited), aff'd, 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986). 
84. United States v. Anderson, 782 F.2d 908, 917-18 (11th Cir. 1986) (rejecting de­
fendant's argument that the basement of his nightclub was rented to other businesses as a 
storage area, and thus exempt from forfeiture); United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 
801 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (RICO forfeiture deprives a guilty defendant of all profits, 
regardless of whether such assets are tainted in connection with the illicit activity), cert. 
denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986); United States v. Conner, 752F.2d 566, 577 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(no "need [to] trace the proceeds to identifiable assets"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1985); 
United States v. Roberts, 749 F.2d 404,410 (7th Cir. 1984) (defendant not allowed to keep 
antique car purchased with racketeering enterprise funds by claiming it was for personal 
use), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1345-46 
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1005 (1984), see supra note 49 for discussion of 
Cauble. See also text accompanying infra notes 174-76 which explains that the appellant'in 
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ests in "the assets of a RICO enterprise are indivisible."85 Thus, if the 
jury finds a RICO violation and the required nexus, all of the defend­
ant's interests in the enterprise are subject to forfeiture. The forfeiture 
"extends to the convicted person's entire interest in the enterprise,"86 
and courts have no power to allow the convicted RICO defendant to 
retain part of the forfeited enterprise. 87 
The total forfeiture provisions of RICO do not threaten the prop­
erty interests of third parties, or defendants who are found innocent of 
RICO charges, even if they also hold an interest in an enterprise which 
is found to be forfeitable. 88 The RICO forfeiture is in personam, and 
Busher totally forfeited his business, even though only three of 14 government contracts 
were involved in racketeering. 
85. United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 
(1983). But see United States V. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1195 (10th Cir. 1982) (entire build­
ing not necessarily subject to forfeiture, only that portion of the partnership's interest ac­
quired by racketeering funds funnelled into partnership by defendant), cert. denied. 464 
U.S. 828 (1983); United States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (defend­
ant not required to forfeit entire interest in corporate entity which owned his airplane be­
cause corporation not used to promote drug smuggling enterprise), aff'd, 784 F.2d 403 
(11th Cir. 1986). 
86. United States V. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis added). 
87. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,470 
U.S. 1052 (1985). In Kravitz, the jury convicted 'a dentist of bribing two police union of­
ficers in order to obtain the contract for the union's dental plan. However, the jury de­
clined to find that Kravitz' dental business should be forfeited to the government, even 
though Kravitz had used the dental practice to engage in a pattern of racketeering. Id. at 
103-04. The appellate court affirmed the district court judge who "refused to follow the 
jury's recommendation and ordered forfeiture of Kravitz's stock and position in" his dental 
services company. Id. at 104. The court noted that any petition for mitigation offorfeiture 
must be brought before the Attorney General. Id. at 105. See also United States V. Hess, 
691 F.2d 188, 190 (4th Cir. 1982); United States V. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir. 1982), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1983); United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796, 809, 812 (5th 
Cir.), reh'g denied, 615 F.2d 383, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 833 (1980). See infra note 97 and 
accompanying text for procedures for mitigation or remission of forfeiture. See infra note 
283 (explaining that adjustment of RICO forfeiture was authorized in United States v. 
Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980), but such'adjustment 
has subsequently been foreclosed by revised statute). 
Cf United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987). In Horak, the defendant 
obtained a city garbage collection contract by bribing city officials. The Horak court af­
firmed the RICO conviction and a portion of the forfeiture order which stripped the de­
fendant of his management job with his waste hauling company. However, the Horak 
court also improperly vacated the portion of the forfeiture order involving the defendant's 
salary, bonuses and corporate pension and profit sharing plans. The court incorrectly de­
termined that partial forfeiture could be imposed, based on an interpretation of the wording 
of § 1963(a)(I), which "divests the convicted defendant of all interests 'acquired or main­
tained' by" racketeering activity. Id. at 1243. The Horak court remanded the forfeiture 
order, instructing the district court to determine whether those interests were "acquired or 
maintained" in violation of RICO. Id. at 1252. The court rejected the defendant's eighth 
amendment challenge to the forfeiture. Id. at 1241. 
• 88. In fact, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(f)-(h) (Supp. IV 1986) grants flexibility in carrying out 
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therefore reaches only the convicted defendant's interest in an enter­
prise, not the enterprise itself.89 Thus, the magnitude of the forfeiture 
under RICO is related directly to the magnitude of the defendant's 
interest in an enterprise used for racketeering activity.90 This built-in 
proportionality is not a feature of in rem forfeiture, which treats the 
property interest to be forfeited as the offender, and does not require 
that the owner of forfeited property be convicted of any crime.91 
In Busher, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that forfei­
ture of an entire enterprise would violate the constitution when a de­
fendant who "owns substantially all the stock of a corporation, or 
a RICO forfeiture, in order to protect the interests of innocent third parties. See S. REP. 
No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 205-06, reprinted in 1984 u.s. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. 
NEWS, 3182, 3388-89. Cf, discussion of in rem forfeiture, infra note 91 and accompanying 
text. 
89. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413 n.7 (9th Cir. 1987). "Section 1963, 
unlike other forfeiture statutes, imposes forfeiture 'directly on an individual as part of a 
criminal prosecution rather than in a separate proceeding in rem against the property sub­
ject to forfeiture.''' United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 948 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting 
United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cm. denied, 445 U.S. 927 
(1980». This concept is illustrated by a hypothetical example provided by the Department 
of Justice: . 
Defendant Joe Smith owns 25% of the common stock of Acme Corporation. 
This ownership interest affords defendant Smith a source of influence over Acme 
Corporation, an enterprise which ... defendant Smith conducted, or participated 
in the conduct of, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c). 
Therefore, defendant Smith's [25%] ownership interest is subject to forfeiture 
pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 1963(a)(2). 
Forfeiture in Drug Cases: Hearings on H.R. 2646, H.R. 2910, H.R. 4110, and H.R. 5371 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime ofthe H. ofRep. Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 
2d Sess. 341 (quoting Notice of Interest Subject to Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(2). 
U.S. Dept. of Justice Manual, Narcotic Prosecutions and the Bank Secrecy Act, Appen­
dix). See also infra note 102 and accompanying text (explaining that the government can 
seize substitute assets from a RICO defendant, and does not need to trace racketeering 
proceeds to assets identified with the criminal conviction, unlike in rem forfeiture). 
90. United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.) (forfeiture of defendant's 
50% interest in a demolition company involved in bid rigging scheme was not cruel and 
unusual punishment), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830,449 U.S. 919 (1980). See infra note 284 
for a discussion of Grande. 
91. See ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECfION, RICO CASES CoMM., supra note 53, at 
77-84. The disproportionality inherentin in rem forfeiture was illustrated on May 8, 1988 
when the government, acting under the National Drug Policy Board's Zero Tolerance Pro­
gram, seized a $2,500,000.00 yacht after a Coast Guard boarding party found less than one­
tenth of an ounce of marijuana on board. This civil forfeiture procedure "allows seizure of 
property used in commission of 135 federal crimes through a lawsuit against the property 
itself." 10 Nat'1 L. J., May 23, 1988, at 5. For an historical analysis of the constitutional 
questions regarding in rem forfeiture, see Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663 (1973) (forfeiture of yacht used to transport marijuana did not deprive innocent 
party of property unconstitutionally). See also Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 
U.S. 505 (1920) (liquor tax-fraud statute did not deprive an innocent corporation of aD 
automobile in violation of the fifth amendment). 
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where the enterprise is a sole proprietorship" is convicted of isolated 
racketeering acts of "relatively minor consequences."92 However, the 
Busher court did not examine the trial court evidence establishing that 
the defeitdant was guilty of more than isolated and minor acts,93 or 
address the effectiveness of administrative procedures at the Depart­
ment of Justice which screen all prospective RICO prosecutions.94 
In the case of a disproportionate forfeiture, the defendant can 
seek dismissal of the RICO indictment by the trial court,95 appeal the 
RICO conviction and forfeiture to an appellate court,96 or seek adjust­
ment of the RICO forfeiture by the Attorney Genera1.97 
92. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413 n.7, 1415. 
93. See infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text (discussing the evidence used to 
convict Busher). 
94. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1411. The Busher court mentioned the Justice Department 
guidelines only briefly, as it dismissed the defendant's claim that the guidelines were not 
followed in the case. Id. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing guide­
lines established by the Justice Department for RICO prosecutions). 
95. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), Motion for Judgement of Acquittal, which states in 
part: 
The court on motion of a defendant or of its own motion shall order the entry of 
judgement of acquittal of one or more offenses charged in the indictment or infor­
mation after the evidence on either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to 
sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. If a defendant's motion for judg­
ment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the government is not 
granted, the defendant may offer evidence without having reserved the right. 
Id. 
96. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(a)(2), Notification of Right to Appeal, which states: 
After imposing sentence in a case which has gone to trial on a plea of not guilty, 
the court shall advise the defendant of ... [his] right to appeal, and of the right of 
a person who is unable to pay the cost of an appeal to apply for leave to appeal in 
forma pauperis. There shall be no duty on the court fo advise the defendant of 
any right of appeal after sentence is imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere. If the defendant so requests, the clerk of the court shall prepare and 
file forthwith a notice of appeal on behalf of the defendant. 
Id. 
97. Congress vested the Attorney General with special authority to adjust RICO 
forfeiture orders. See United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1984) (petition 
for mitigation or remission must be brought before the Attorney General and courts have 
no authority to modify or review that decision); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 
1346 (5th Cir.) (the Attorney General, not the courts, is responsible for remission or miti­
gation of RICO forfeitures), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 
U.S. 1005 (1984). Cj. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979) (court can 
condition forfeiture on defendant's payment of fine), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980); see 
infra note 283 and accompanying text for a discussion of Huber. 
18 U.S.C. § 1963(h) (Supp. IV 1986) states: "The Attorney General may promulgate 
regulations with respect to ... granting petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeitures 
...." Id. "The authority described in subsection (h) includes: (I) granting petitions for 
remission or mitigation of forfeiture ... (2) compromising claims ...." S. REp. No. 225, 
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 206, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3182, 
3389. The regulations for remission or mitigation of forfeitures are contained in 52 Fed. 
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III. THE TOTAL FORFEITURE: PURPOSE AND PROBLEMS 
A. Purpose of Total Forfeiture 
Congress intended RICO forfeiture to be a punitive measure,98 
which would deter, incapacitate, and remove the racketeer who has 
corrupted a commercial enterprise.99 Although the legal and illegal 
activities of a defendant may be intertwined, the forfeiture of a legally 
conducted business interest serves as a punishment for the illegal ac­
tivity,IOO and serves to prevent the defendant from engaging in further 
racketeering activity. 101 To these ends, Congress continues to 
strengthen the forfeiture provisions of RICO. 102 
Reg. 32,785 (1987) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 9). Under these regulations, remission of 
a forfeiture is allowed only if the petitioner took all reasonable steps to prevent illegal use of 
the forfeited property. The defendant must also prove he or she had no knowledge that the 
forfeited property would be used in violation of the law, and that he or she had no knowl­
edge of the particular violation which subjected the property to forfeiture, or no knowledge 
that the user of the forfeited property had any criminal record. If the petitioner does not 
meet these minimum conditions for remission, he or she may still be granted mitigation of 
forfeiture "where there are present other extenuating circumstances indicating that some 
relief should be granted to avoid extreme hardship." 52 Fed. Reg. 32,788 (1987). 
98. United States v. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492,498 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming forfei­
ture of gross profits from highway bid rigging conspiracy), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 
(1986). 
99. 116 CoNG. REc. 18,955 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan), quoted in Rus­
sello v. United States, 465 U.S. 16, 28 (1983). 
In United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1987), the court affirmed the forfei­
ture of the defendant's job, relying on court decisions where "[t]he rationale behind these 
job forfeiture orders seems to be that section [1963](a)(1) demands that the defendant be 
separated from any employment position that afforded him the opportunity to engage in 
the racketeering activity for which he was convicted." Id. at 1242 (citing United States v. 
Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States 
v. Rubin, 559 F.2d 975,992 (5th Cir. 1977), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 810 (1978». 
100. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d at 498. . 
101. As the original drafters stated, the RICO forfeiture provisions deal "not only 
with individuals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals consti­
tute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of our Nation." S. REp. No. 617, 91st 
Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 79 (1969), quoted in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983). 
102. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(n) (Supp. IV 1986), an amendment to RICO enacted under 
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat., 3207, provides for forfei­
ture of substitute assets in cases where defendants made ot~erwise forfeitable property un­
reachable. See 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5393. Section 1963(n) states that 
if any property subject to forfeiture: 
(1) cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence; 
(2) has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party; 
(3) has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court; 
(4) has been substantially diminished in value; or 




the court shall order the forfeiture of any other property of the defendant up to 

the value of any property described in paragraphs (I) through (5). 
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The Supreme Court repeatedly has affirmed the purpose and ap­
plication of RICO, while rejecting suggestions that it narrow the reach 
of the statute's forfeiture provisions. 103 The Court recognized the 
need for total forfeiture as a means to prevent a racketeering defendant 
from avoiding forfeiture by transferring assets from one part of the 
enterprise engaged in illegal racketeering to another part. 104 Yet, crit­
ics of RICO believe the total forfeiture provisions could lead to dispro­
portionate forfeitures because trial judges have no authority to exclude 
from forfeiture any property of a convicted RICO defendant, once the 
jury determines that the language of section 1963(a) covers the 
property. 10' 
18 U.S.C. § 1963(n) (Supp. IV 1986). By allowing substitute assets: 
the forfeiture . . . acts as a money judgment against the defendant for the same 
amount of money which came into his hands illegally, regardless of whether the 
government has traced the path of the specific illegal funds. It matters not 
whether the government receives the identical money which the defendant re­
ceived or other 'substitute' money. 
Oversight on Civil RICO Suits, supra note 43, at 114-15, (statement of Associate Attorney 
General Stephen Trott) (citing United States v. Connor, 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir. 1985». 
See also Lynch, supra note 52. 
In suggesting that the substantive provisions of RICO be revised, Professor Lynch 
recommends that "Congress and the United States Sentencing Commission should explore 
whether the financial sanctions attached [to a revised RICO statute] should be increased 
further, whether by additional. fines, or by the expanded use of restitution and forfeiture." 
Id. at 980. See also Reed, Criminal Forfeiture Under a Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 
1984: Raising the Stakes, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 747 (1985); United States v. Robilotto, 
828 F.2d 940, 949 (2d Cir. 1987) (because RICO forfeiture is in personam, the government 
need not trace proceeds of racketeering activities to identifiable assets). Cf in rem forfei­
ture, discussed in infra note 91 and accompanying text. But see Hughes & O'Connell, In 
Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies: An Expansion ofa Harsh Eng­
lish Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 613 (1984) (substitute 
asset scheme would raise constitutional questions). 
103. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1984); United States v. Rus­
sello, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 587 (1980). 
104. Russel/o, 464 U.S. at 28. See also United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 825 (1983). The Walsh court stated: 
Determining the degree of the enterprise's criminal taint is not contemplated by 
the statute. Congress enacted RICO as a more potent weapon than fines or prison 
terms in an attempt to eradicate organized crime's economic base. . .. Differenti­
ating between those parts of a RICO enterprise engaged in racketeering activity 
and those that are not is not a requirement under the statute for determining 
whether a defendant's interest is subject to forfeiture. If such were the case Con­
gress' purpose would be completely thwarted simply by a transfer of assets from 
one part of the enterprise engaged in illegal racketeering to another part not so 
engaged. 
Id. citation omitted. 
105. United States v, Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1414 (9th Cir. 1987). But see infra 
notes 271-95 and accompanying text (discussing proper procedures for judicial review and 
dismissal of RICO indictments and convictions). For the text of § 1963(a) see supra note 
81. 
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B. The Danger ofDisproportionality 
Total forfeiture could present a problem of disproportionality if a 
RICO defendant is convicted for crimes involving only a small portion 
of a valuable business or property. 106 Disproportionality, however, is 
not a serious consideration in cases of traditional criminal behavior 
where a "mobster" may be ordered to forfeit a business which he or 
she has corrupted and taken over by violent criminal means. How­
ever, there is concern that the broad reach of RICO's forfeiture provi­
sions may cause disproportional forfeitures now that the RICO 
forfeiture provisions are being used "not only against individuals asso­
ciated with inherently criminal activity, e.g., narcotics, arson, murder 
for hire and loan sharking, but also against persons charged with cor­
porate misbehavior and commercial frauds."107 Under this view, the 
forfeiture of a business operated by white-collar criminals engaged in 
lawful business activity poses a greater danger of disproportionality 
than the forfeiture of property connected with drug dealing under 
traditional in rem forfeiture procedures. 108 Critics of the expanded use 
of the RICO forfeiture statute suggest that there is less danger of dis­
proportionality in narcotics cases, since the forfeiture targets totally 
criminal enterprises which have no legitimate purposes. 109 However, 
this distinction between RICO and narcotics forfeitures has disap­
peared in recent cases where property used in drug trafficking has been 
intertwined with legitimate activities,l1O again raising eighth amend­
106. The possibility of forfeitures so disproportionate as to violate the eighth amend­
ment was the basis for ordering an extensive proportionality review of the Busher forfei­
ture. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that "RICO's impressive breadth, and 
the interplay of its substantive and punitive provisions, may result in forfeitures of vast 
amounts of property as a result of relatively minor offenses." Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414 n.9. 
See infra notes 152-232 and accompanying text for a discussion of Busher. 
107. Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act: Hearings on H.R. 3272. H.R. 3299. and H.R. 
3725. Before the Subcomm on Crime ofthe House Comm on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 49 (statement of Attorney Stephen Hom and Attorney William W. Taylor) [hereinaf­
ter Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act: Hearings]. 
108. See supra note 91 and accompanying text, explaining the danger of dispropor­
tionality inherent in in rem forfeiture. See also infra notes 233-40 and accompanying text 
(discussing disproportionality problems arising from forfeitures under the Drug Abuse Pre­
vention and Control Act (DAPCA), 18 U.S.C. § 853). 
109. Comprehensive Drug Penalty Act: Hearings, supra note 107, at 43-44 (remarks of 
Attorney William Taylor). 	 Under the drug trafficking forfeiture statute: 
[t]he [drug] transaction itself is malum in se. ... That is, there is nothing legiti­
mate about it. ... But the application of RICO to economic and commercial 
crime, and political corruption . . . raises difficulties precisely because in those 
areas, there is an intertwining of legitimate and illegitimate money and legitimate 
and illegitimate conduct. 
Id. 
110. See supra note 91, discussing proportionality questions raised in in rem forfei­
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ment questions. III " 
Commentators also sympathize with white-collar criminals who 
intertwine their legitimate businesses with illegal racketeering activity. 
Fearing that the total forfeiture provisions could inflict an economic 
penalty disproportionate to a defendant's crimes, it is argued that 
RICO becomes "vulnerable to an eighth amendment challenge when 
imposed concurrently with the already severe penalties of imprison­
ment and fines." I 12 Some RICO critics say that RICO forfeiture pro­
visions should be repealed and replaced with criminal fines levied by 
the court in proportion to the defendant's profits. 113 One commentary 
has suggested that Congress amend RICO so that the government 
would be required to prove that a criminal violation has tainted the 
property to be forfeited, in order to prevent a disproportionate 
forfeiture. 114 
Another suggested amendment to RICO, proposed by the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Marubeni America 
Corp., liS would allow defendants "to divest themselves of interests in 
an enterprise, thereby avoiding forfeiture."116 The court hypothesized 
that under the total forfeiture provisions of RICO, "a shopkeeper who 
over many years and with much honest labor, establishes a valuable 
business, could forfeit it all if, in the course of his business, he is mixed 
up in a single fraudulent scheme." 117 Arguing that forfeiture is not 
the only effective penalty against corporate racketeers, the Marubeni 
ture cases. See also infra notes 241-70 (discussing United States v. McKeithen, 822 F.2d 
310 (2d Cir. 1987), and United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
Ill. Littlefield, 821 F.2d at 1366-68. 
112. Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 165, 292-93 (1980). 
113. Note, A Proposal to Reform Criminal Forfeiture Under RICO and CCE, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 1929, 1946 (1984). 
114. Note, Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: "Rough" Justice 
Is Not Enough, 14 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 451, 483 (1987). 
115. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980) (government appeal of district court dismissal of 
forfeiture of $8.8 million in teiephone cable contract profits allegedly obtained by Japanese 
companies through bribery). In Marubeni, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals attempted 
to narrow the reach of RICO forfeiture, holding -that RICO's section 1963(a) does not 
allow the government to seize "amounts paid or payable" for performance of a contract. 
Id. 764-66. The Supreme Court rejected the Marubeni holding in Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16,29 (1983). The Court declared that "[e]very property interest, includ­
ing a right to profits or proceeds, may be described as an interest in something." Id. at 22. 
See supra notes 31 and 49 and accompanying text for further discussion of Russel/o. 
"Among other things, Marubeni cannot be reconciled with RICO's liberal construction 
clause." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, RICO CASES 
COMM., supra note 53, at 85 n.85 (1985). 
116. Marubeni, 611 F.2d at 769 n.ll. 
117. Id. at 769-70 n.12. The Marubeni court predicted that RICO forfeiture could 
417 1988] RICO-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CRIMINAL FORFEITURE 
court declared that to allow a RICO defendant to "divest" from a 
racketeering enterprise would accomplish the congressional purpose of 
freeing legitimate organizations of the influence of organized crime. IIB 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' interpretation of RICO's 
intent and purpose, however, is flawed. The court did not discuss the 
possibility that racketeers would simply sell off one enterprise and 
transfer their assets to another enterprise. 1l9 This would defeat the 
congressional purpose of punishing persons who corrupt business en­
terprises, since the RICO defendant would be allowed to keep assets 
which otherwise would be forfeited to the government under the law. 
Courts must bear this purpose in mind when reviewing RICO forfeit­
ures to determine whether they violate the eighth amendment protec­
tion against disproportionate punishments. 120 
IV. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im­
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 121 
A. History of the Amendment 
Once understood as a protection only against physical torture, 122 
produce "shockingly disproportionate" results, although Marubeni left the constitutional 
question of disproportionality "for another day." Id. at 769-70 n.12. 
118. Id. at 770 n.ll. The Marubeni court stated that "[i]f corporate officers are 
fined, imprisoned and divested of their interests in the enterprise, their successors are un­
likely to imitate their misconduct." Id. at 769 (footnote omitted). Cf supra notes 46-52 
and accompanying text (discussing RICO forfeiture as an effective punishment for white­
collar crime). 
" 119. See Bradley, Racketeers. Congress, and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 
IOWA L. REV. 837, 890 n.284 (1980). "Defendants could largely thwart the purpose of 
RICO by divesting themselves of the asset in question after indictment and later buying it 
back with retained funds." Id. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (explaining 
that one purpose of RICO forfeiture is to remove the racketeer from the corrupt enter­
prise). 
For a critical analysis of the Marubeni opinion see Trojanowski, RICO Forfeiture: 
Tracing and Procedure; Appendix: United States v. Marubeni America Corp. and the Scope 
ofRICO Forfeiture. in 1 TECHNIQUES IN THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF OR­
GANIZED CRIME 378a (G. Blakey ed. 1980). 
120. See infra notes 271-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of proper eighth 
amendment review of RICO forfeiture orders. 
121. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
122. Grapucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Mean­
ing, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969). In his discussion of the "cruel and unusual punish­
ments" clause of the eighth amendment, Professor Granucci writes that "[j]udges and 
scholars alike have been content to accept the conclusions of the American framers that the 
clause was originally designed to prohibit the barbarous methods of punishment and that it 
was not, therefore, intended as a general prohibition on merely excessive penalties." Id., at 
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the eighth amendment has evolved into a limitation on any type of 
punishment that the government may inflict. 123 The eighth amend­
ment protection limiting all criminal punishments to those which are 
proportionate to the crimes has evolved from the common law. 124 The 
Supreme Court has traced the eighth amendment's roots back to the 
Magna Carta,125 citing Weems v. United States,126 as the case where 
"[t]he Court endorsed the principle of proportionality as a constitu­
, tional standard . . . and determined that the sentence before it was 
'cruel in its excess of imprisonment,' ... as well as in its shackles and 
restrictions."127 While eighth amendment protections for criminal de­
fendants and the proportionality principle have continued to evolve 
and expand,128 the eighth amendment cannot be construed as giving 
the courts "a blank check to "regulate criminal sanctions."129 The 
eighth amendment never was intended to give the courts free-wheeling 
power to regulate criminal punishments, or grant undefined sentencing 
power to the courtS.130 The power to establish criminal sentences is 
839. Professor Granucci concludes that the American framers misinterpreted the intent of 
the drafters of the English Bill of Rights, resulting in limitations on the scope of eighth 
amendment protections. Id. 
123. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the 
Eighth Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REV. 838, 839 (1972). Professor Wheeler quotes Weems 
v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910), in which the Supreme Court stated "[The 
amendment] is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion 
becomes enlightened by a humane justice." Wheeler, supra, at 839. He also quotes Trop v. 
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958), in which Chief Justice Warren wrote that the eighth 
amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society." Wheeler, supra, at 839. 
124. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285 (1982). 
125. Id. at 284. 
126. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). In Weems, "the defendant had been convicted of falsifying 
a public document and sentenced to 15 years of 'cadena temporal,' a form of imprisonment 
that included hard labor in chains and permanent civil disabilities." Solem, 463 U.S. at 
287. 
127. Solem, 463 U.S. at 287 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 377). 
128. See Solem, 463 U.S. at 287. The Court cites Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) 
(striking down the deportation and loss of citizenship of an Army deserter as cruel and 
unusual and a violation of the eighth amendment), Id. at n.12, and Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962). In Robinson, "[a] 90-day sentence was found to be excessive for the 
crime of being 'addicted to the use of narcotics.''' Solem, 463 U.S. at 287 (quoting Robin­
son, 370 U.S. at 664). 
Additionally, the principle of proportionality was a prime consideration during the 
Court's deliberations over the constitutionality of the death penalty. Solem, 463 U.S. at 
288-90. See B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 207, 211, 431, 439 (1979) 
(discussing the Court's death penalty deliberations). 
129. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351, 1366 
(1986). 
130. Id. In the words of Judge Posner: 

The framers may have understood "cruel and unusual punishments" to mean 
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vested in the legislature, and the duty of the judiciary is to carry out 
those sentences.!3! The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored these 
concepts of judicial duty and separation of powers in United States v. 
Busher 132 by ordering an extensive review of all RICO forfeiture or­
ders under the guise of eighth amendment disproportionality 
principles.!33 
B. Solem v. Helm 
The defendant in Solem v. Helm 134 had six prior convictions for 
nonviolent offenses, and was sentenced under South Dakota's recidi­
vist statute to life in prison without parole for passing a worthless 
$100.00 check. 135 The Court used these facts to illustrate the concept 
of disproportionate criminal sentences, and to provide guidelines for 
determining whether a particular criminal sentence is disproportionate 
in violation of the eighth amendment. However, the Supreme Court 
prefaced the Solem guidelines with a warning that" '[o]utside the con­
text of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality 
of particular sentences [will be] exceedingly rare.' "136 The Solem 
Court cited Justice Powell's concurrence in Hutto v. Davis,137 which 
something fairly precise but intended the courts to be free to depart from that 
understanding. While this is undoubtedly true to some extent, it becomes implau­
sible when carried to the point of making the prohibition against cruel and unu­
sual punishments a delegation of undefined lawmaking power. If the framers of 
the Constitution had wanted to delegate a plenary power of judicial review to the 
federal courts, they would have chosen some method other than the enactment of 
ten separate amendments, many with several clauses and some with highly spe­
cific language. 
I am not suggesting that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish­
ments should be limited to punishments known in 1791 when the eighth amend­
ment was adopted. A legislator can intend a law to apply to circumstances that 
he cannot foresee. . . . But there is an important difference between intending to 
limit unforeseen punishments in particular ways and giving the federal courts a 
blank check to regulate criminal sanctions. The latter intention is implausible 
Id. at 1365-66. 
131. As Chief Justice Marshall stated, "the intention of the lawmaker must govern in 
the construction of penal, as well as other statutes .... Where there is no ambiguity in the 
words, there is no room for construction." United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96 
(1820). 
132. 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). 
133. See infra notes 180-217 and accompanying text (discussing the improper use of 
the Solem guidelines by the Busher court). 
134. 463 U.S. 277 (1982). 
135. Id. at 277. 
136. Id. at 289-90 (quoting Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980) (emphasis 
added by Solem court)). 
137. 454 U.S. 370 (1981) (per curiam). The Court ordered dismissal of a writ of 
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emphasized the rarity of successful proportionality challenges, cau­
tioned against the intrusion of appeals courts into the sentencing man­
dates of the legislatures, and warned of the anarchy which would 
prevail in the federal judicial system if lower courts failed to follow the 
precedents established by the Supreme Court. 138 
The Solem guidelines instruct a lower court faced with a propor­
tionality problem to compare: 
J 
(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the 
sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, that 
is, whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to 
less serious penalties; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commis­
sion of the same crime in other jurisdictions. 139 
The Supreme Court also stated that a court should compare the length 
of different sentences,14O and consider the harm caused by the defend­
ant as well as the defendant's CUlpability and intent. 141 The Supreme 
Court used this analysis to determine that the petty offender in Solem 
was "treated in the same manner as, or more severely than, other 
criminals in South Dakota who have committed far more serious 
crimes."142 The Court affirmed a lower court decision to issue a writ 
of habeas corpus sought by the defendant. 143 
The Court cautioned against interpreting the Solem guidelines as 
establishing "a general rule of appellate review of sentences."I44 The 
habeas corpus obtained by an inmate sentenced to 40 years in prison for possession of nine 
ounces of marijuana. Id. at 371. The inmate argued that his sentence was so grossly dis­
proportionate that it violated the eighth amendment. Id. The Court held that by issuing 
the writ, the lower court had intruded into the legislative province of establishing criminal 
sentences. Id. at 374. 
138. Id. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring). 
139. Solem, 463 U.S. at 278, 290-92. 
140. Id. at 278,.294-95.. 
141. Id. at 278, 292-94. 
142. Id. at 278. In a lengthy dissent, Chief Justice Burger concluded that the Solem 
decision rejected recent Supreme Court precedent established in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 
U.S. 263 (1980), and Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982). Solem, 463 U.S. at 304, 310 
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger stated that "Hutto makes crystal clear that under Rum­
mel it is error for appellate courts to second-guess legislatures as to whether a given sen­
tence of imprisonment is excessive in relation to the crime ...." Id. at 311 (footnote 
omitted). In Chief Justice Burger's view, an exception to the rule of judicial restraint may 
occur "in extraordinary cases-such as a life sentence for overtime parking-[where] it 
might be permissible for a court to decide whether the sentence is grossly disproportionate 
to the crime." Id. at 311 n.3. Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court did "not contend 
that [Solem] is such an extraordinary case that reasonable men could not differ about the 
appropriateness of this punishment." [d. 
143. Id. at 283-84, 303. 
144. Id. at 290 n.16. The Court stated: 

Absent specific authority, it is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its 
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principles of substantial deference to the legislature and sentencing 
courts emphasized in Solem have restrained appeals courts from en­
gaging in extended analysis of proportionality of criminal sentences. 145 
Courts are reluctant to use the Solem analysis in appeals of economic 
penalties, where no deprivation of liberty is involved. 146 
C. Disproportionate Economic Sanctions and the Eighth 
Amendment Protection 
The eighth amendment protects a criminal defendant's liberty 
and property.147 While the Supreme Court did not address criminal 
judgment for that of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular 
sentence; rather, in applying the Eighth Amendment the appellate court decides 
only whether the sentence under review is within constitutional limits. In view of 
the substantial deference that must be accorded legislatures and sentencing 
courts, .a reviewing court rarely will be required to engage in extended analysis to 
determine that a sentence is not constitutionally disproportionate. 
Id. 
145. United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 63 (2d Cir.) (maximum prison sentence for 
violent car theft conspiracy does not require extended disproportionality analysis), cert. 
denied, 107 S. Ct. 3214 (1987); United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1175 (3d Cir. 
1986) (sentences for firearms convictions are within constitutional limits and do not require 
extended analysis), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2465 (1987); United States v. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 
1019, 1028 (4th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Solem as requiring extensive proportionality analy­
sis "only in those cases involving life sentences without parole"), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 
2916 (1986); United States v. Panza, 750 F.2d 1141, 1153 (2d Cir. 1984)(defendant's back­
ground and participation in mail fraud scheme to defraud auto insurance companies inap­
posite to Solem, where gross disproportionality of the sentence was readily apparent); 
Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171, 180 n.lO (5th Cir. 1983) (extensive analysis not required 
with regard to every habeas corpus petition raising the issue of disproportionality), cert. 
denied, 466 U.S. 975 (1984). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the Solem disproportionality 
analysis is not called for in every case. United States v. Meyer, 802 F.2d 348, 353 (9th Cir. 
1986) (rejecting Solem claim by child molester who wanted his sentence harmonized with 
sentences for similar offenses in other courts) (citing United States v. Barker, 771 F.2d 
1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1985) (distiict court not required to harmonize sentences with other 
district courts; however district court failed to frame the punishment to the particular cir­
cumstances of the defendant». 
146. See United States v. Sato, 814 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1987). The Sara court 
determined that a $20,000.00 fine for failure to file income tax returns was within statutory 
parameters and not disproportionate. The fact that defendant was fined, and not sentenced 
to jail, weakened the defendant's disproportionality argument. Id. United States v. Fisch­
bach and Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183, 1193 (3d Cir. 1984) ($1,000,000.00 fine for anti-trust 
violation not disproportionate), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1029, 470 U.S. 1085 (1985). 
147. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. The Solem Court noted that "the Eighth Amendment 
imposes 'parallel limitations' on bail, fines, and other punishments." Id. (quoting Ingra­
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977». In Ingraham, the Court held that the eighth 
amendment proscribes cruel and unusual punishments in the context of criminal sentences, 
and does not apply to the paddling of children as a means of discipline in the schools. 
Thus, the status of eighth amendment protections for civil court judgments, and other eco­
nomic penalties outside the scope of criminal convictions, remains unclear. See Freeman, 
422 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:393 
forfeiture specifically in Solem or the other eighth amendment cases, 
appellate courts consistently have recognized that the eighth amend­
ment prevents "harsh" or "draconian" applications of the RICO for­
feiture statute. 148 
The Supreme Court has stated that the eighth amendment "text is 
explicit that bail and fines may not be excessive,"149 but the Court has 
not issued an opinion which instructs the lower courts on how to de­
termine whether an economic penalty is disproportionate. The justices 
appear to be waiting for the right case upon-which to frame their anal­
ysis of eighth amendment protections for economic rights. ISO In the 
meantime, the argument that the eighth amendment governs forfeiture 
of property is perhaps best summarized by the Supreme Court's state­
ment in Solem v. Helm that "no penalty is per se constitutional."lsl 
V. UNITED STATES V. BUSHER - A CASE STUDY 
A. .Trial Evidence 
The appellant in Busher engaged in textbook acts of white-collar 
Inappropriate and Unconstitutional Retroactive Application ofSuperfund Liability, 42 Bus. 
LAW. 215, 239-40 (1986) (concluding that Federal Superfund penalties are subject to dis­
proportionality review since Solem and other Supreme Court decisions interpret the eighth 
amendment as protecting takings of pr:operty); Gorey & Einhorn, The Use and Misuse of 
Economic Evidence in Horizontal Price-Fixing Cases, 12 J. CONTEMP. L. 1, 45 n.185 (1986) 
(Solem has not resulted in significant trial court review of anti-trust sentencing decisions); 
Comment, Punitive Damages and the Eighth Amendment: An Analytical Framework for 
Determining Excessiveness, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1433, 1434 (1987) (suggesting that punitive 
damages should be subjected to eighth amendment analysis). 
148. See United States v. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming 
RICO forfeiture for bid rigging convictions), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); United 
States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.) (affirming RICO forfeiture for bribery convic­
tions), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States V. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980) (see infra notes 283-84 and accompanying text for 
discussion of Huber). One court of appeals has required'that the eighth amendment chal­
lenge of RICO forfeiture be raised during trial of the case. United States v. Caporale, 806 
F.2d 1487, 1507 n.26 (11th Cir. 1986) (eighth amendment challenge of $1,200,000.00 for­
feiture not considered because it was not raised at trial), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3191, 107 S. 
Ct. 3265 (1987). . 
149. Solem, 463 U.S. at 289. One commentator has found that the historical fore­
runners of eighth amendment protections show concern for protecting both property and 
liberty from excessive punishment. Granucci, supra hote 122, at 865. 
150. See Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645, 1650-51 (1988) 
(declining to reach appellant's claim that punitive damages award violated excessive fines 
clause of the eighth amendment since that claim was not considered by Mississippi 
Supreme Court), and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 828-29 (1986) (declining 
to reach eighth amendment argument against $3,500,000.00 punitive damages award, but 
noting the argument raises, "important issues which, in an appropriate setting, must be 
resolved"). 
151. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. at 290. 
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crime, including coercion, concealment and exploitation of the trust of 
his victims to carry out long-running criminal activity.152 After gain­
ing credibility with the United States Department of Defense and a 
bonding company, Busher obtained large building contracts for Atlan­
tic Construction (ATL), and undertook a deliberate scheme that 
spanned three years to defraud the government. IS3 
In order to establish J.W. Contracting, Busher went to the office 
of a corporate agent in Carson City, Nevada, and paid him to form the 
new corporation. Busher signed his own name and forged the name of 
a former associate, Joseph Wall, on the Nevada incorporation pa­
pers. IS4 Busher fabricated supporting documents for J.W. Con­
tracting, including minutes of a stockholders' meeting, a list of 
shareholders, and phony subcontracting agreements with A TL, in or­
der to falsify the company's assets and tax returns. ISS 
While J.W. Contracting had no office in Nevada and never per­
formed any construction work, Busher "caused A TL to execute . . . 
checks totalling ... $753,000.00 to J.W. Contracting for bogus con­
struction expenses."IS6 These payments enabled Busher to falsify in­
come tax records,ls7 and inflate the cost of government contracts. ISS 
Also, J.W. Contracting owned a house in Zephyr Cove, Nevada, and a 
house in Honolulu, Hawaii, which Busher depreciated as rental 
properties, although he used both houses as residences. ls9 Busher's 
152. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a discussion of white-collar 
crime patterns. 
In addition to the RICO violations and the predicate offense of mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1341), "Busher was ... convicted of submitting false statements to the government (18 
U.S.C. § 1001), presenting false claims to the government (18 U.S.C. § 287), ... tax evasion 
(26 U.S.C. § 7201), and submitting false income tax returns (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1»." 
"Busher was sentenced to four years imprisonment on the RICO counts; [the sentence was] . 
to run concurrently" with a total of four years for the other convictions. United States v. 
Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1410-11 (9th Cir. 1987). Busher is eligible for early parole under 18 
U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2). Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order at 1, United States v. 
Busher, (Cr. No. 84-02445-01) (D. Haw. 1985). 
153. Transcript at 1776-79, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. Haw. 
1985) (testimony of James Busher). 
154. Brief for the United States at 12, United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1122) (citing Transcript at 1489-96, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84­
02445) (D. Haw. 1985) (testimony of Joseph Wall) and at 1500-07 (testimony of Ray 
Castello». 
155. Brief for the United States at 22 (citing Transcript, at 1580-90 (testimony of 
Paul Rappaport»; 1500-07 (testimony of Ray Castello). 
156. Brief for the United States at 19. 
157. Id. at 20. 
158. Id. at 14. 
159. Id. at 23-24. 
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total income tax fraud amounted to $190,000.00. 160 
In carrying out the construction contracts granted to A TL, 
Busher defrauded both the government and the employees who la­
bored on those contracts. After coercing construction workers to sign 
fraudulent independent contractor agreements, Busher filed falsified 
certifications of compliance, which misrepresented low wages paid to 
carpenters and laborers in violation of Busher's contract with the 
Navy and in violation of the Davis-Bacon ACt. 161 In violation of con­
tract terms which limited profits on contractor change orders to six 
percent of the change, Busher subn~itted a claim to the Navy which 
nearly doubled the cost of safety glass. 162 Other fraudulent claims in­
flated the cost of construction projects and brought the total amount 
obtained by ATL through the contract fraud to $165,000.00163 
Another dimension to the frauds perpetrated by Busher was the 
use of substandard materials. Busher used untreated lumber at a 
Navy renovation project, where more costly pressure-treated lumber 
was specified in order to prevent a reinfestation of termites. To con­
ceal this deceit, Busher ordered laborers to brush a colored treatment 
solution onto the lumber and used a row of trees to hide this activity 
from government inspectors. 164 Additionally, Busher used green lum­
ber for a Navy building project, rather than kiln-dried lumber speci­
fied by the Navy contract. This action did not become known until 
the lumber dried and shrank, leaving gaps in the walls of the build­
ing. 165 In Busher, the government's loss was far greater than the ap­
160. Brief of Appellant at 19, United State v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(No. 85-1122) (citing Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. Busher, (Cr. No. 84­
02445-01,02) (D. Haw. 1985), at 11). 
161. Brieffor the United States at 7 (citing Transcript, at 213-14 (testimony of Russ 
Thirolf), at 303 (testimony of William Asinsin), at 312 (testimony of Robert Laa), at 324­
25 (testimony of Victor Romano), at 358 (testimony of David Thieme), and at 546-48 (testi­
mony of Reed Rosa). 
The Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. § 276(c) (1982), authorizes the Secretary of Labor to 
require all public works contractors to furnish weekly wage statements with respect to each 
employee. 
162. Brief for the United States at 10-11, (citing Transcript, supra note 4, at 806-15 
(testimony of Larry Uyehara)). 
163. Brief of Appellant at 19 (citing Sentencing Memorandum, United States v. 
Busher, (Cr. No. 84-02445-01, 02) (D. Haw. 1985), at 11). 
164. Brief for the United States at 8-9 (citing Transcript at 220 (testimony of Russ 
Thirolf), at 253-59 (testimony of James Bullock), at 286-87 (testimony of Clyde Thomas 
Asinsin), and at 309 (testimony of Robert Laa)). 
165. Brief for United States at 18-19 (citing Transcript at 1189-90, 1193 (testimony 
of William Nicholls), and at 1236-41 (testimony of Peter Johnson, Jr.)). 
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pellant's fraudulent gains. 166 
B. Busher's Forfeiture Sentence 
For his fraudulent conduct, James Busher was ordered to forfeit 
his entire interest in ATL and J.W. Contracting. The jury determined 
that all stock of ATL and J.W. Contracting, including the house 
owned by J.W. Contracting in Zephyr Cove, Nevada, was subject to 
forfeiture, becaU!~e they were acquired or maintained in violation of 18 
U.S.C. section 1962.167 
Although ATL carried out lawful construction contracts, it also 
"played an integral role in the racketeering scheme."168 Busher used 
J.W. Contracting "as a smokescreen to bill for work not done, claim a 
residence as a business asset, and cheat on his taxes .... [N]o activity 
engaged in by J.W. Contracting Co. can fairly be described as lawful 
business."169 As the trial judge observed, Busher had a scheme in 
mind as he operated his construction businesses. 170 "It was the mind 
of a person who was intent to perpetrate fraud on the United States 
166. Sentencing Memorandum at 1 i-12, United States v. Busher, (Cr: No. 84-02445­
01,02) (D. Haw. 1985). 
For the government to repair the damage ... would require reconstruction of 
much of the projects that were performed by ATL, Inc. The use of green lumber 
... resulted in a shoddy job which would require an expenditure of the magnitude 
of the original ... contract to cure in full .... 
The use of the untreated lumber ... resulted in harm beyond the mere cost 
savings to the defendants ... [and will] substantially reduce the longevity of the 
job done since termite infestation will most likely reoccur. To cure the fraud now 
would require dismantlement and replacement of wood throughout the building, 
causing disruption to Navy operations as well as a large expenditure. 
Other victims of defendants' conduct were the employees and subcontractors 
that dealt with the defendants. The unconscionable appropriation of the names of 
former employees ... and former associate J. Wall, could potentially have impli­
cated them in the defendants' crimes. Their association with this conduct still 
holds potential adverse consequences for them in their future careers. 
Additional victims of the defendants' conduct were the employees whO were 
underpaid ... [and] pressured into signing fraudulent independent contractor 
agreements ... [denying them] wage rates and fringe benefits required to be paid 
them by law. 
Id. 
167. Judgment and Probation/Commitment Order at 1, United States v. Busher (Cr. 
No. 84-02445-01) (D. Haw. 1985). 
168. Brief for the United States at 35. 
169. Id. 
170. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 26, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84­
02445) (D. Haw. 1985) (statement of Judge Fong). 
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"171 Busher took the proceeds of his illegal conduct, and "lived an 
enhanced lifestyle at the expense of those whom he defrauded."172 
While it is true that the legal operations of ATL were' intertwined with 
the illegal activity, the evidence of racketeering justified Busher's con­
viction and total forfeiture of his business. The damages that Busher 
caused were of a magnitude which justified the forfeiture of his 
business. 
For Busher, a lengthy jail sentence would be inappropriate. Total 
forfeiture is a truly meaningful punishment, well suited to Busher's 
crimes}?3 The forfeiture sentence is an economic penalty which will 
serve as a deterrent to other business people who may be tempted to 
use their companies as vehicles for fraudulent schemes. 174 
C. Busher's Disproportionality Appeal 
On appeal, Busher did not challenge the jury's finding that his 
business interests were forfeitable under the RICO statute. Instead, he 
claimed "that the forfeiture of his entire interests in ATL, J.W. Con­
tracting and the Nevada real estate is grossly disproportionate to the 
offenses for which he was convicted."175 Busher noted that ATL's le­
gitimate business involved contracts which were untainted by racke­
teering activity, 176 that his fraudulent acts were limited to three 
171. Id. 
172. Sentencing Memorandum at 13, United States v. Busher, (Cr. No. 84-02445-01, 
02) (D. Haw. 1985). 
173. As Judge Fong noted at Busher's sentencing, there are four factors which the ~ 
court considers when sentencing a defendant: deterrence, rehabilitation, public safety and 
retribution. Judge Fong told Busher: 
[T]here can be no greater deterrent than you have already suffered by the Court 
signing this order of forfeiture, where life's work may have gone down the drain 
over the instances of the Moanalua [construction] contract, the Kaneohe [con­
struction] contract, the CINCPACFLT [construction] contract. And so, it is not 
deterrence that I will sentence you by. 
Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 27, United States v. Busher (Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. 
Haw. 1985) (statement of Judge Fong). The judge noted that Busher is not a threat to 
public safety, and did not need rehabilitation. However, the judge found that the degree of 
retribution required the court to impose a period of time of incarceration. Id. 
After serving two years and eight months, Busher was released from the custody of the 
Federal Bureau of Prisons on Feb. 9, 1988. Telephone interview with Sandra Richards, 
Inmate Information Officer, Federal Bureau of Prisons, Washington, D.C. (May 18,1988). 
174. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative and 
judicial recognition of this purpose of RICO forfeiture). 
175. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1414. 
176. Brief of Appellant at 18-19, United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 
1987) (No. 85-1122). From 1977 to 1983, ATL performed contracts worth $27,000,000.00. 
The racketeering acts of mailing a false invoice, and mailing false progress payment checks 
involved contracts worth $11,322,306.00. 
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contracts,177 and that he faithfully carried out six contracts subse­
quently awarded by the Department of Defense. 178 The Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals adopted this line of reasoning in its holding in 
Busher. 179 
D. The Improper Reasoning of the Busher Decision 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Busher had made 
"a prima facie showing that the forfeiture may be excessive ...."180 
The court recognized that the RICO statute provides no judicial dis­
cretion for adjustment of a forfeiture order. 181 Yet, the court re­
manded the case, and ordered the district court to review the evidence 
and determine whether a partial forfeiture should be imposed on 
Busher. 182 
The Busher court ignored the trial court evidence and reasoned 
that a RICO forfeiture could produce disproportionate results if the 
convicted RICO defendant owns a large business involved in a rela­
tively minor racketeering scheme. 183 Busher's violations do not fit the 
definition of a minor scheme. It is unrealistic to place Busher in the 
category of the hypothetical "shopkeeper" involved in a single fraudu­
lent scheme which the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals proposed in 
177. Id at 18. 
178. Id at 5-6. The defendant in United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985), presented a similar argument, claiming that for­
feiture of his dental services company was disproportionate because the fraudulently ob­
tained contract had expired before he was indicted. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
rejected this argument: 
Since A.H.P. [the defendant's company] was no longer providing services pursu­
ant to the illegally secured contract, Kravitz would have us accept that the taint 
upon the property had dissipated, and thus that the order of forfeiture was cruel 
and unusual punishment, in violation of the eighth amendment. 
Kravitz's eighth amendment argument completely ignores the nature of 
RICO's forfeiture provision. Forfeiture under RICO is an in personam penalty 
designed as part of the punishment for the criminal offense committed. It is sim­
ply incorrect that the termination of the criminal conduct bars the imposition of 
punishment. 
Id at 106 (citations omitted). See supra note 87 for a discussion of Kravitz. 
179. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1413-14. 
180. Id at 1415. . 
181. Id. 
182. Id at 1416. 
183. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415-16. The trial court record established that the 
defendant's criminal acts caused damages comparable to the forfeited property. Yet, the 
Busher court declared the defendant had made a "prima facie showing that the forfeiture 
may be excessive." Id at 1415. Cj. United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(review of trial court evidence ·to affirm forfeiture of motel). See infra note 285 (explaining 
that the appellate court in Tunnell examined trial court evidence to determine dispropor­
tionality issue). 
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United States v. Marubeni. 184 Additionally, the Supreme Court re­
jected the notion that courts should speculate on how a law will affect 
"hypothetical cases,"18S and has commented on the undesirability of 
considering "every conceivable situation which might possibly arise in 
the application of complex and comprehensive legislation."186 
In Busher, the court declared that RICO's forfeiture provisions 
may create a case in which "the amount forfeited may have no rela­
tionship whatsoever to the severity of the wrong committed."187 This 
speculation contradicts the broad judicial policy which limits courts to 
considering only the facts and issues presented by the parties to a con­
stitutional dispute. 188 The Supreme Court has held consistently that 
184. 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980). See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Marubeni. The defendant in Busher was responding to the Ninth Cir­
cuit's invitation in Marubeni to challenge the RICO forfeiture statute on the grounds of 
disproportionality. The Brief of Appellant in Busher stated that "[w]hat we have in this 
case is the Marubeni court's hypothetical 'shopkeeper.' The evidence at trial clearly 
demonstrated that the fraudulent activities of which Appellant stands convicted, and par­
ticularly those charged as racketeering activities, represented a small portion of the ATL/ 
JW construction business." Brief of Appellant at 17-18, United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 
1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1122). 
185. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,22 (1960). "The delicate power of pro­
nouncing an Act of Congress unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypo­
thetical cases thus imagined .... [A]pplication of this rule frees the Court not only from 
unnecessary pronouncement on constitutional issues, but also from premature interpreta­
tions of statutes in areas where their constitutional application might be cloudy." Id., 
quoted in United States v. Boffa, 513 F. Supp. 444, 461 (D. Del. 1980) (RICO statute not 
unconstitutionally vague). 
In Raines, a district court judge dismissed the complaints against public officials in 
Georgia who were being prosecuted under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 for discriminating 
against blacks who desired to vote. "Although the complaint involved only official actions, 
the [district] Court construed ... [the Act] as authorizing suits to enjoin purely private 
actions and held ... that the Act must be considered unconstitutional in all its applica­
tions." Raines, 362 U.S. at 17. The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, stating that the 
defendant's conduct fell within the reach of the statute, and that the defendants could not 
attack a statute on the grounds it is unconstitutional to third parties. Id. at 27. 
186. Raines, 362 U.S. at 21 (quoting Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 256 (1953)). 
187. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415 n.9. 
188. See a famous concurring opinion by Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 
U.S. 288, 341, 346-48 (1936), summarizing the rules which the Court developed for limiting 
its review of constitutional questions. See also Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 
U.S. 505 (1920). In Goldsmith-Grant the Supreme Court rejected the appellant's specula­
tive claims that the constitutional prohibition against deprivation of life, liberty and prop­
erty without due process of law might be violated in subsequent liquor tax forfeiture cases. 
It is said that a Pullman sleeper can be forfeited if a bottle of liquor be taken upon 
it by a passenger, and that an ocean steamer can be condemned to confiscation if a 
package of liquor be innocently received and transported by it: Whether the indi­
cated possibilities under the law are justified we are not called upon to con­
sider. . . . When such application shall be made it will be time enough to 
pronounce upon it. 
Id. at 512. See supra note 91 for discussion of in rem forfeiture. 
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constitutional judgment should be made "only out of necessity of adju­
dicating rights in particular cases between litigants brought before the 
Court."189 Federal courts have no jurisdiction to pronounce a law un­
constitutional, unless called upon "to adjudge the legal rights of liti­
gants in actual controversies."190 By ignoring the evidence in the case, 
and remanding the case to the district court, the Busher court disre­
garded its judicial duty to decide Busher's eighth amendment 
appeal. 191 
The Busher court instructed district courts to undertake an exten­
sive disproportionality review in all RICO forfeiture cases, using the 
Solem guidelines as the standard of review. 192 In addition to violating 
189. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973) (affirming the constitutional­
ity of a state statute prohibiting civil service workers from engaging in partisan politics). 
"The traditional rule is that a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied 
may not challenge that statute on the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconsti­
tutionally to others in situations not before the Couq." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
767 (1981) (bookstore proprietor convicted under statute prohibiting child pornography). 
"By focusing on the factual situation before us, and similar cases necessary for devel­
opment of a constitutional rule, we face 'ftesh-and-blood' legal problems with data 'relevant 
and adequate to an informed judgement [sic].''' Id. 'at 768 (footnote omitted) (quoting A. 
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 115-16 (1962), and Frankfurter & Hart, The 
Business o/the Supreme Court at October Term, 1934,49 HARV. L. REv. 68, 95-96 (1935). 
190. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-68 n.20 (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia 
S.S. Co. v. Commissioner of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39 (1884», quoted in United States v. 
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960). In Ferber, the Supreme Court stated that judicial review of 
constitutional questions is limited by two basic rules: "one, never to anticipate a question of 
constitutional law in advance of the necessity for deciding it; the other, never to formulate a 
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied." Id. at 767-68 n.20. (quoting Liverpool. New York & Philadelphia S.S. Co., at 39), 
quoted in Raines, 362 U.S. at 21. "In addition to prudential restraints, the traditional rule 
is grounded in Art. III limits on the jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and con­
troversies." Ferber, 458 U.S. at 767-68 n.20 (1981). 
191. As Chief Justice Marshall stated: "[I]f a law be in opposition to the constitution 
... the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of 
the very essence ofjudicial duty." Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), 
quoted in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611 (1973). 
192. Perhaps the Busher court based its order for extensive review of RICO forfeit­
ures on the constitutional principles outlined in Solem because the Supreme Court rejected 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' attempt in Marubeni to narrow the RICO forfeiture 
statute through statutory construction. In recalling that the Marubeni decision had been 
overruled, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that "[t]he Supreme Court's decision 
did not, however, bear on our observation that section 1963 could produce disproportion­
ate penalties." Busher, 817 F.2d at 1412 n.2. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of Marubeni. 
The Busher forfeiture opinion was written by Judge Alex Kozinski, who "votes con­
sistently against governmental takings--incJuding 'the taking' of private property by rent 
control and the 'taking' of a word out of the English vocabulary by trademark law." Earl 
Wa"en Would Blush, Legal Times Special Supplement: Reagan Justice: A Conservative 
Legacy on the Appellate Courts, May/June 1988, at 48. 
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the general policy' of judicial restraint, this instruction violates the 
Supreme Court's directive that appeals courts use the Solem guidelines 
in "exceedingly rare" cases to decide "whether the sentence under re­
view is within constitutional limits." 193 
Finally, the Busher court's .application of Solem to RICO forfeit­
ures contemplates the possibility of partial forfeitures, even though 
Congress mandated total forfeiture of any enterprise involved in a 
RICO violation. 194 By proposing partial forfeitures, the Busher court 
attempts to legislate. a new forfeiture penalty, thus encroaching upon 
the powers of Congress. 195 The Supreme Court in Solem did not au­
thorize such disregard for sentencing statutes, emphasizing instead the 
need for "substantial deference" to legislative intent. 196 
193. Solem, 463 U.S. 277, 290 & n.16 (1982). The appellate court should still con­
cern itself only with the "manifestly unjust" sentence. United States v. Sato, 814 F.2d 449, 
453 (7th Cir. 1987) (rejecting disproportionality challenge to a $20,000 fine for tax evasion), 
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 294 (1987) (citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 377 (1982) (powell, 
J., concurring». For discussion of Justice Powell's concurrence in Hutto, see supra notes 
137-38 and accompanying text. 
194. See supra notes 81-105 and accompanying text for a discussion of total forfei­
ture provisions of RICO. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that RICO 
"gives the district judge no authority to exclude from the forfeiture order any of the prop­
erty the jury finds is covered by the liberal language of section 1963(a)." Busher, 817 F.2d 
at 1414. 
195. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333,344 (1980). In Albernaz, the Supreme 
Court held that consecutive sentencing did not violate the double jeopardy clause of the 
fifth amendment because Congress intended to permit imposition of consecutive sentences 
for violation of drug laws. The Court stated that "the 'power to define criminal offenses 
and to prescribe punishments to be imposed upon those guilty of them, resides wholly with 
the Congress.''' Id. (quoting United States v. Whalen 445 U.S. 684, 689 (1979) (consecu­
tive sentences for rape and murder not prohibited by fifth amendment guarantee against 
multiple punishment for the same offense». See also United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 
1215, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2199 (1987). In Holland the court 
affirmed the double prison sentence of a defendant convicted of dealing drugs within 1,000 
feet of a school. The Holland court stated that "[p]unishment established by a democrati­
cally elected legislature is presumed valid, and a 'heavy burden rests on those who would 
attack the judgment of the representatives of the people.''' Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976». 
196. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290 n.16 (1982). Moreover, the Court has affirmed the con~ 
stitutionality of the mandatory total forfeiture penalty. See supra notes 103-04 for a discus­
sion of these Supreme Court opinions. Historically, the Court has respected the legislative 
intent which underlies forfeiture penalties. In the forfeiture case of United States v. 1960 
Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398 (1814), the Supreme Court stated: 
In the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice, enterprize [sic] and combi­
nations of individuals on the one hand, and the power charged with the adminis­
tration of the laws on the other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the 
executive to carry into effect the measures of policy adopted by the legislature. 
Id. at 405. 
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E. The Busher Court's Incorrect Application of the Solem 
Disproportionality Guidelines 
The Busher court instructed the trial court to reexamine the trial 
court record and limit the RICO forfeiture order to a portion of the 
defendant's interest consistent with the Solem principles. 197 In its ap­
plication of the Solem disproportionality guidelines, the Busher court 
ignored the trial court's supervision of the case, the special forfeiture 
verdict rendered by the jury, and the disproportionality safeguards al­
ready established by Congress and the Attorney General. I98 The first 
Solem factor, gravity of the offense compared to the harshness of the 
penalty, is an appropriate consideration. The district courts use this 
criterion in sentencing RICO defendants. 199 Appellate courts also can 
apply the principle to determine whether a RICO prosecution and sen­
tence was justified against a particular defendant.2°O 
The second prong, comparing the forfeiture with sentences im­
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, is not workable in 
the context of the economic penalty imposed under RICO. Unlike the 
traditional common law crime illustrated in Solem, RICO is a non­
traditional federal statute, with unique purposes and prohibitions not 
readily analogous to other criminal dffenses. 201 The economic penal­
197. To calculate the partial forfeiture, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in­
structed the district court to consider: 
(1) the harshness of the penalty [including not only the forfeiture but also any 
incarceration, fines or probation imposed by the district court] in light of the 
gravity of the offense; 
(2) sentences imposed for other offenses in the federal system; and 
(3) sentences imposed for the same or similar offenses in other jurisdictions. 
United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (citing Solem, 463 U.S. at 292) (footnote by 
the court in brackets). 
198. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text, (discussing prosecutorial discre­
tion), and see supra note 97 for 52 Fed. Reg. 32,785, 32,788 (1987) (containing the text of 
administrative powers vested in the Attorney General for mitigation of forfeitures). The 
defendant in Busher also ignored . these congressionally established means of forfeiture re­
view, and did not seek remission or mitigation. Brief for the United States at 34, United 
States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987) (No. 85-1122). 
199. See supra note 173 (Judge Fong's determination that Busher'S crimes required 
jail time as well as forfeiture), and see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (prison and 
fines under the RICO statute are at the court's discretion). 
200. See infra notes 271-95 for a discussion of appropriate constitutional and statu­
tory review of RICO forfeiture. 
201. See United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 
S. Ct. 2465 (1987), a case in which the court determined that prison sentences for federal 
firearms convictions were not disproportionate. The court conducted an abbreviated eighth 
amendment review based on Solem, and stated that "[b]ecause [the] defendants' crimes are 
federal and lack clear state analogues," the determination of proportionality would rest 
only on the first two Solem factors, and there was no need to compare the defendants' 
432 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:393 
ties imposed on white-collar criminals cannot be compared meaning­
fully with the prison sentences imposed for traditional crimes. 
The third prong of the Solem analysis, comparisons of sentences 
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions, also 
is difficult to apply in RICO cases. The value of property forfeited in a 
given RICO case rarely will be comparable to any other forfeiture sen­
tence. To attempt to weigh the value of these forfeitures against the 
severity of predicate offenses committed by other RICO defendants 
would require substantial judicial resources and would achieve mean­
ingless results. 202 
The Busher court also instructed the' district court to take into 
account the magnitUde of the crime, dollar volume of loss caused, 
whether physical harm was inflicted, or whether the crime has conse­
quences such as drug addiction.203 These are valid considerations 
which already are part of the RICO indictment, trial and sentencing 
process.204 As in any other criminal prosecution, the trial court and 
the appellate court can dismiss the entire RICO case if the government 
fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a RICO violation.20s 
The Busher court also instructed the district court to consider the 
defendant's motive and state of mind in deciding whether a forfeiture 
is proportionate to other forfeiture sentences.206 These important con­
siderations also are part of standard trial procedures. The prosecution 
must establish the defendant's intent and state of mind at trial, in or­
der to obtain a RICO conviction and forfeiture. 207 If an appellate 
court finds that these elements were not established at trial, the RICO 
conviction would be dismissed and the forfeiture vacated. 
However, the Busher court's requirement that the trial court con­
sider the degree to which the racketeering enterprise is infected by 
sentences with statistics for similar crimes in other jurisdictions. Id. at 1175-76. See also 
supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (explaining that the eighth amendment does not 
give courts the power to legislate criminal sentences). 
202. The wide range of RICO violations and forfeiture sentences may be ascertained 
by comparing the RICO cases cited in supra notes 35 and 49. 
203. United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1987). 
204. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text (explaining that these factors 
were considered in sentencing Busher). 
205. See supra notes 95 and 96 and accompanying text, which discuss FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 29 and 32(a). See also infra note 256 (comment by Judge Wood that a defendant con­
victed under DAPCA can seek to have the court enter a judgment of acquittal if the d~­
fendant's violations do not fit the proscribed offense). 
206. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415. 
207. The intent to use an enterprise in racketeering is a prerequisite to establishing 
RICO liability. See supra notes 61-91 for description of the procedures for obtaining a 
RICO conviction and forfeiture. 
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criminal conduct208 contradicts the mandatory total forfeiture provi­
sions of the RICO statute which have been reviewed and affirmed by 
courts faced with similar appeals.209 The Busher court's incorrect ap­
plication of Solem is illustrated by its instruction that district courts 
allocate taint to the defendant's criminal assets, and: 
[first] limit the forfeiture to such portion of the interest as it deems 
consistent with these [Solem disproportionality] principles; or [sec­
ond] it may condition the forfeiture upon payment of such sum or 
relinquishment of such other property as seems just under the cir­
cumstances;2iO or [third] it may limit or eliminate other punishment 
it would otherwise impose so as to bring the total sanction within 
constitutional boundaries.211 
The first two instructions, which allow partial forfeiture and redemp­
tion of forfeited property, are contrary to Supreme Court decisions 
which uphold total forfeiture and its purpose of complete removal of 
the defendant from a position of influence over the forfeited prop­
erty.212 The third instruction, limiting other penalties in order to 
bring the total punishment within constitutional boundaries, is a 
proper consideration and already is part of the trial court's sentencing 
discretion under the RICO statute. Section 1963 requires that the trial 
judge decide whether a prison sentence or fines should be imposed on 
the convicted RICO defendant in addition to the mandatory forfeiture 
penalty.213 
Finally, Busher suggests that the district court may consider 
whether a RICO forfeiture will "threaten the defendant's economic 
viability" when determining proportionality.214 This consideration is 
208. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1415. 
209. See supra notes 85-92 for a discussion of totality of RICO forfeiture provisions. 
See also supra notes 98-105 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of total 
forfeiture). 
210. Busher noted the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' conditional forfeiture in 
Huber "giving the convicted defendant the option to redeem his corporations by payment 
of cash or other property worth $100,000." Busher, 817 F.2d at 1416 n.13 (citing United 
States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 391 (2d Cir. 1979), em. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980». 
However, a recently enacted statute has eliminated this option. See infra note 283 for a 
discussion of the statutory amendment to RICO which prohibits defendants from repur­
chasing forfeited interests. 
211. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1416. 
212. See Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1984); United States v. Rus­
sello, 464 U.S. 16,21,28 (1983); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,587 (1980). See 
supra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion of Russel/a. 
213. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (explaining that under § 1963, the 
trial judge has discretion over whether to sentence a defendant to serve a prison term and/ 
or pay fines). 
214. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1416 n.12 (quoting Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitution­
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totally inappropriate and defeats the very purpose of RICO, which is 
to remove the defendant from an enterprise used for criminal 
purposes.21 5 
The allocation of taint and improper comparisons ordered by the 
Busher court would eliminate the uniform standard which Congress 
built into the RICO statute: total forfeiture of the defendant's interest 
in any enterprise used in racketeering. The statute was intended as an 
all-or-nothing measure to punish violators, and separate them from 
their racketeering enterprises. If a court determines that a defendant's 
criminal acts do not warrant prosecution under the RICO statute and 
the forfeiture sentence is not roughly proportional to those crimes, the 
RICO conviction should be reversed and the RI~O forfeiture should 
be found unconstitutional and vacated.216 In enacting RICO, Con­
gress established a straightforward procedure which prohibits courts 
from engaging in complex computations to determine whether the de­
fendant is being forced to part with more assets than the RICO viola­
tions produced.217 
F. Determining that the Busher Forfeiture Was Proportionate and 
Constitutional 
The first step of the proportionality analysis set out in Solem com­
pares "the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty."218 
As the Solem Court noted, "stealing a million dollars is viewed as 
more serious than stealing a hundred dollars."219 In Busher, the ap­
ality ofPunitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 154 (1986) (suggesting that eighth amend­
ment prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment be extended by analogy to civil 
damage awards). ­
215. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (explaining that the purpose of 
RICO forfeiture is to remove defendant from corrupted enterprise). 
216. See infra notes 276-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rough 
proportionality analysis by which courts of appeals can insure a RICO forfeiture does not 
violate the eighth amendment. 
217. See United States v. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 
U.S. 1082 (1986). In Lizza Industries, the court held that a RICO forfeiture properly in­
cluded the defendant's gross profits from a highway bid rigging conspiracy. The court 
stated that: 
RICO does not require the prosecution to prove or the trial court to resolve com­
plex computations, so as to ensure that a convicted racketeer is not deprived of a 
single farthing more that his criminal acts produced. RICO's object is to prevent 
the practice of racketeering, not to make the punishment so slight that the eco­
nomic risk of being caught is worth the potential gain. 
Id. at 498. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text (discussing the punitive purpose 
of total forfeiture under RICO). 
218. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1982). 
219. Id. at 293. 
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pellant obtained $190,000.00 through income tax fraud and 
$165,000.00 through contract fraud. 220 Additionally, the contract 
frauds can be remedied only by large expenditures and the disruption 
of government operations.221 While the total cost of this harm cannot 
be calculated, it may be considered comparable to the value of the 
$3,000,000.00 in assets forfeited by the appellant, especially in light of 
"the culpability of the offender."222 A court examining the culpability 
of the offender may distinguish between less serious negligent conduct 
and more serious intentional conduct.223 In Busher, the appellant 
"was intent" on committing these frauds. 224 The Solem Court also 
stated that a court "is entitled to look at a defendant's motive in com­
mitting a crime. "225 Busher's motive was selfish personal gain at the 
expense of his victims.226 These criteria lead to the conclusion that 
forfeiture of Busher's business was appropriate and not "cruel and un­
usual" when compared to his RICO violations. 
The Solem Court recognized that there may be other criteria use­
ful in "comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale," 
and that courts will have difficulty drawing distinctions between penal­
ties imposed for similar crimes and for crimes committed in other ju­
risdictions.227 In Solem, the comparisons with penalties imposed in 
other jurisdictions led the Court to conclude that the appellant "was 
treated more severely than he would have been in any other state."228 
In a RICO forfeiture case, an extensive comparison as contemplated 
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Busher is impractical due to 
the wide variation of RICO violations and forfeitures. Any compari­
son of the RICO forfeiture sentence imposed in Busher with similar 
forfeiture penalties imposed in other jurisdictions should be under­
taken within the concept of rough proportionality, which is the stan­
dard of review used by other courts of appeals to determine whether 
RICO forfeiture sentences are disproportionate.229 The Busher forfei­
ture is roughly proportionate when compared to the RICO forfeitures. 
220. See supra notes 160 and 163 and accompanying text (documenting dollar 
amounts of Busher obtained through fraud). 
221. See supra note 166 (Sentencing Memorandum). 
222. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
223. Id. at 293. 
224. See supra note 170-71 (Judge Fong's statements at Busher's sentencing hearing). 
225. Solem, 463 U.S. at 293. 
226. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (Sentencing Memorandum). 
227. Solem, 463 U.S. at 294. 
228. Id. at 300. 
229. See infra notes 283-89 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of rough 
proportionality). 
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imposed on defendants in other jurisdictions.23o The appellant in 
Busher, who was subjected to total forfeiture after being properly con­
victed under RICO,231 was not treated more severely than he would 
have been in another jurisdiction. The trial court record supplied to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reveals that the RICO statute was 
applied properly in Busher, and that the RICO forfeiture penalty was 
proportionate and not in violation of constitutional protections.232 If 
the court had examined the trial court record, it could have decided 
Busher's appeal without unnecessarily remanding the case. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals embarked on a similar di­
gression in an appeal of forfeiture of property forfeited under the Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act. The court has again used the 
eighth amendment and Solem v. Helm to depart from a mandatory 
forfeiture statute. 




A. The DAPCA Forfeiture Mechanism 
Just as the Supreme Court and most circuit courts of appeals 
have followed the intent of Congress to impose total forfeiture on con­
victed RICO defendants, most courts have also recognized the con­
gressional intent underlying the mandatory criminal forfeiture 
provisions of the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act 
(DAPCA).233 Congress considered and passed DAPCA in October 
1970, the same month it enacted RICO.234 While the RICO statute is 
230. See United States v. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1985) (forfeiture of 
gross profits from highway bid rigging scheme), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); United 
States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1984) (forfeiture of dental practice), cert. denied, 
470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1347 (5th Cir.) (forfeiture of 
business enterprise), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 
(1984); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982) (forfeiture of motel used as 
a place of prostitution). 
231. Cf supra note 91 for a discussion of in rem forfeiture, in which the property 
owner need not be convicted to obtain forfeiture of property. 
232. See supra notes 152-74 and accompanying text (discussing the extent of 
Busher's fraudulent schemes). On remand, the district court determined "that the punish­
ment imposed upon Busher in this case was not 'grossly disproportionate to the offense 
committed.''' In Re Forfeiture at 13, United States v. Busher, (Cr. No. 84-02445) (D. 
Haw. May 6, 1988). In reality, the court found that "ATL had little value as a going 
concern" and that "[a]fter the company was liquidated, there was not even enough money 
to satisfy the creditors' claims, many of which were compromised due to lack of funds." 
Id. 
233. Comprehensive Drug Prevention Abuse and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 
91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, reprinted in 1970 U.s. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 1437. 
234. Id. 
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aimed at a wide range of racketeering violations, the DAPCA forfei­
ture provisions specifically target drug traffickers.235 The legislative 
history of the DAPCA statute indicates that it was designed to punish 
large-scale drug trafficking,236 rather than small-time users.237 
The DAPCA forfeiture provisions were expanded and re-codified 
under 18 U.S.c. section 853 by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act 
of 1984, and now mandate forfeiture of any property which a con­
victed defendant obtained through or used in serious drug offenses.238 
These forfeiture provisions are in addition to the provisions of 21 
U.S.c. section 848 which mandate forfeiture of any property used by a 
defendant convicted of operating a Continuing Criminal Enterprise 
235. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, RICO CASES CoMM. supra note 35, at 87. 
This note is limited to a discussion of the criminal forfeiture provisions of DAPCA. 
21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)-0) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The statute provides for civil forfeiture of 
property, including land, involved in drug trafficking. See Darmstadter & Mackoff, Some 
Constitutional and Practical Considerations of Civil Forfeitures Under 21 u.s. C. § 881, 9 
WHfITIER L. REV. 27 (1987), for a discussion of constitutional and procedural protections 
for civil forfeitures under DAPCA. 
236. "The price for participation in this traffic should be prohibitive. It should be 
made too dangerous to be attractive." H.R. REp. No. 1444, 91st. Cong., 2d. Sess. 9, re­
printed in 1970 U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4566, 4575. 
237. Id. (goal of DAPCA is rehabilitation of drug users). See also United States v. 
Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1334 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing 116 CoNG. REc. 1183 (January 26, 
1970) (remarks of Senator Dole, distinguishing the "professional criminal" from the 
"youthful offender"». ­
238. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 
(1974) (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. III 1985». Section 853(a) provides: 
Any person convicted of a violation of this subchapter or subchapter II of this 
chapter punishable by imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the 
United States, irrespective of any provision of State law ­
(1) 	 any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person 
obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation; 
(2) . any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any man­
ner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of such violation; 
and 
(3) 	 in the case of a person convicted of engaging in a continuing criminal 
enterprise in violation of section 848 of this title, the person shall forfeit, 
in addition to any property described in paragraph (1) or (2), any of his 
interest in, claims against, and property or contractual rights affording 
a source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise. 
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (Supp. III 1985) 18 U.S.C.A. § 853(P) (West Supp. 1988) allows the 
court to order forfeiture of substitute assets for any forfeited property which cannot be 
located or has been transferred by the defendant. This provision, allowing substitute assets, 
is parallel to the substitute assets provision added to the RICO statute by 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1963(n) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra note 102 (discussing § 1963(n». 
Under another provision parallel to RICO, the Attorney General is vested with au­
thority of remission or mitigation of forfeitures under § 853. 21 U.S.C. § 853(i) (Supp. IV 
1986) states that "the Attorney General is authorized to (I) grant petitions for mitigation 
or remission of forfeiture[s]." Id. 
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(CCE).239 Like the RICO forfeiture mechanism, forfeitures under 
DAPCA are in personam, thus requiring that the defendant be con­
victed before his or her property is forfeited.240 
B. Statutory and Constitutional Challenges to DAPCA 
Total forfeitures under DAPCA have been attacked on both stat­
utory and constitutional grounds. In United States v. McKeithen,241 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the 
forfeiture of a drug dealer's entire interest in a parcel of real estate and 
remanded the case for entry of judgment in accord with the jury's ver­
dict.242 The court interpreted section 848(a)(2)(B) of DAPCA243 as 
allowing allocation of taint and proportional forfeiture of property 
used in a continuing criminal enterprise.244 Relying on decisions in 
239. 21 U.S.C. 848(a) (Supp. III 1985). Section'848(a) provides: 
Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be sen­
tenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and which 
may be up to life imprisonment, to afine of not more than $100,000, and to the 
forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title; except that if any person engages 
in such activity after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have 
become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be 
less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more 
than $200,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed in section 853 of this title. 
Id. (emphasis added). See supra note 238 for the text of § 853(a). Unlike RICO, which 
leaves imposition of fines and prison sentences to the trial court's discretion, the fines and 
prison sentences are mandatory under CCE. 
21 U.S.C.A. § 848(b) (West Supp. 1988) states that to be convicted of engaging in a 
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, a person must commit a felony violation of the DAPCA 
in which he or she organizes, supervises or manages at least five other people. The defend­
ant must also obtain substantial income or resources from the violation. 
240. Cf supra note 91 (discussing in rem forfeiture). 
241. 822 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1987) (appeal of forfeiture order by a drug dealer con­
victed of operating a continuing criminal enterprise). 
242. Id. at 312. In McKeithen, the trial court ordered the defendant to' forfeit both a 
two-family house and an adjoining apartment building, even though the jury found only 
43% of the property afforded him an influence over his continuing criminal enterprise. Id. 
"This allocation [of the 43% interest] was undoubtedly based on evidence showing that the 
... defendant's narcotics enterprise operated out of the two-family house; the six apartment 
unit, on the other hand, was not engaged in the narcotics enterprise." Id. 
243. 21 U.S.c. § 848(a)(2)(B) (1982) provided, in part, that: 
any person who is convicted ... of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise 
shall forfeit to the United States ... any of his interest in, claim against, or prop­
erty or contractual rights of any kind affording a source of influence over, such 
enterprise. 
McKeithen, 822 F.2d at 313 (quoting 21 U.S.c. § 848(a)(2)(B) (1982) (emphasis added». 
Subsequent to McKeithen, Congress amended the DAPCA forfeiture provisions, eliminat­
ing the "affording a source of influence" language. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1974) (presently codified at 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. III 
1985». See supra note 238 for the text of the revised statute. 
244. The McKeithen court noted that "[t]he word 'property' is modified by the 
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analogous RICO cases which held that RICO forfeitures are 
mandatory and total,245 the government argued that "the plain lan­
guage of section 848 does not authorize allocation oftaint."246 But the 
McKeithen court distinguished the RICO cases from its interpretation 
of DAPCA and declared that accepting the government's argument 
would require the court to interpret the statute literally and could lead 
to unreasonable and "bizarre" results.247 
In United States v. Littlefield,248 the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a statutory argument against total 
forfeiture. The court found that Congress explicitly stated "that prop­
erty is subject to forfeiture if it was used 'in any manner or part' to 
commit or facilitate a drug offense, [and thus] Congress plainly pro­
vided for forfeiture of property even where only a portion of it was 
used for the prohibited purpose. "249 After determining that Congress 
did not intend to allow partial forfeitures under DAPCA, the Little­
field court then conducted a constitutional analysis which con~luded 
that the district court could impose a partial forfeiture. 25o 
The court found that, like RICO, section 853 presented the po­
tential for disproportionate forfeitures in violation of the eighth 
-amendment.251 The court remanded the section 853(a)(2) forfeiture 
phrase 'affording a source of influence over' which renders reasonable [the] defendant's 
proportional forfeiture argument." McKeithen, 822 F.2d at 315 (quoting 21 U.S.c. § 848 
(a)(2)(B) (1982». 
245. Id. at 314. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text for RICO cases hold­
ing that forfeiture is mandatory and total. 
246. McKeithen, 822 F.2d at 313. 
247. Id at 315. 
248. 821 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987). The defendant in Littlefield was convicted of 
growing 700 marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(I). Under 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985), the government sought forfeiture of Littlefield's interest in the 
40 acre parcel on which the marijuana was grown. Id at 1366. The district court declined 
to order the total forfeiture of Littlefield's farm, as mandated by § 853, and ordered the 
defendant to forfeit only the acreage .. 'used or intended to be used to commit or facilitate 
the commission' ofa drug felony." Littlefield, 821 F.2d at 1366 (quoting United States v. 
Littlefield, 637 F. Supp. 632, 637 (N.D. Cal. 1986». When the government appealed the 
district court ruling, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the statutory interpreta­
tion limiting § 853(a)(2) and turned to an eighth amendment analysis which also allowed 
for partial forfeiture. 
249. Littlefield, 821 F.2d at 1367 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (Supp. III 1985». See 
supra note 238 for text of the statute. The court also rejected the defendant's second argu­
ment, which would have used the civil forfeiture provisions of DAPCA as a comparative 
benchmark to narrow the interpretation of § 853. 
250. Littlefield, 821 F.2d at 1368. 
251. Littlefield, 821 F.2d at 1368. The court stated: 

Here, as with RICO's forfeiture provisions, section 853 makes forfeiture of de­

fendant's entire property interest mandatory, leaving the district court no discre­

tion to avoid excessively harsh or fortuitous applications. The district court, 
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order and instructed the district court to conduct an extensive eighth 
amendment disproportionality review based on the guidelines estab­
lished by the Supreme Court in Solem v. Helm. 252 As it did in United 
States v. Busher,253 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disregarded 
the Supreme Court's cautions against using the Solem analysis except 
in cases of manifestly unjust sentences.254 
By allowing the defendants to keep portions of property involved 
in drug transactions, the McKeithen and Littlefield courts did not 
carry out the congressional intent to impose total forfeiture on drug 
traffickers. This is contrary to the nearly universal judicial adherence 
to strict enforcement of prison sentences mandated by DAPCA. 
C. Judicial Deference To The CeE Sentencing Statute 
As in RICO forfeiture appeals, courts have been mindful of the 
eighth amendment principles outlined in Solem, but have not injected 
the extensive Solem disproportionality analysis into eighth amendment 
appeals of DAPCA forfeitures and prison sentences.255 Courts have 
carried out the penalties mandated by Congress under DAPCA, with 
few exceptions.2s6 In United States v. Darby,2S7 the United States 
however, has the constitutional responsibility to assure that a forfeiture proceed­
ing under section 853 does not inflict excessive punishment in violation of the 
eighth amendment. 
Id. 
252. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text for a dis­
cussion of Solem. 
253. 817 F.2d 1409 (9th Cir. 1987). See supra notes 152-232 for a discussion of 
Busher. 
254. See supra notes 136-38, 144 for a discussion of the Supreme Court's cautions in 
using the Solem guidelines. 
255. United States v. Holland, 810 F.2d 1215 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (affirming double 
prison term mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 845(a) for distributing drugs near a school); United 
States v. Amend, 791 F.2d 1120, 1127 (4th Cir.) (finding no merit to defendant's contention 
that 21 U.S.C. § 848 is unconstitutional), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 399 (1986). Although 
rejecting the constitutional challenge, the court vacated the forfeiture order on other 
grounds. Amend, 791 F.2d at 1129. See also United States V. Rhodes, 779 F.2d 1019 (4th 
Cir.) (50 and 75 year prison sentences without parole are severe but not disproportionate to 
drug conviction), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2916 (1985); United States V. Ortiz, 742 F.2d 712 
(2d Cir.) (rejecting eighth amendment appeal by 18 year old heroin addict and pusher 
sentenced to 10 years in prison and 10 years of special parole), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 
(1984). . 
256. In one noteworthy exception, United States V. Ambrose, 740 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1017 (1985), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the 
§ 848 convictions of ten former Chicago police officers. The officers had been sentenced to 
10 to 15 years in prison for providing protection to a continuing criminal enterprise, but the 
court held that they only aided the enterprise, and were not within the minimum sentenc­
ing provisions of § 848. Judge Posner, writing for the majority, declared that "in sentenc­
ing an aider and abettor, the district judge is not bound by the minimum sentence 
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Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the sixty year 
prison terms imposed on defendants convicted under section 848. The 
Darby court stated that the sentences constituted severe punishment, 
but after reviewing the trial record, concluded that "the actual contin­
uing criminal enterprise in which appellants were engaged was se­
vere."258 Emphasizing the Supreme Court's admonition in Solem that 
appellate courts give "substantial deference to the broad authority that 
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishment for crimes, as well as to the discretion that trial courts 
possess in sentencing convicted criminals, "259 the Darby court deter­
mined that the prison sentences were "not so grossly disproportionate 
to their crime as to violate the eighth amendment."260 
The Darby court also noted that the unique nature of section 848 
made it difficult, if not impossible, to apply the Solem guidelines, 
which call for comparison of sentences imposed for commission of the 
same crime in other jurisdictions.261 The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap­
peals also recognized the impracticality of applying Solem to CCE 
cases.262 
provisions in the kingpin statute." Id. at 510. Cf. text accompanying supra note 130 (quot­
ing Judge Posner's article which calls for judicial restraint when applying the eighth 
amendment to sentencing statutes enacted by Congress). However, a dissenting judge in 
Ambrose stated that: 
some district judges may hesitate to use Judge Posner's newly created judicial 
invitation to wander outside the statute. . .. [T]he sentencing judge has all the 
discretion needed under the continuing criminal enterprise penalty provision ... . 
If a defendant does not meet each of the criteria for being an aider and abettor .. . 
then a judgment of acquittal should be entered. 
Ambrose, 740 F.2d at 515 (Wood, J., concurring and dissenting). 
257. 744 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985). 
258. Darby, 774 F.2d at 1527. 
259. Id. at 1526 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983». 
260. Darby, 744 F.2d at 1529. 
261. Id. See also text accompanying supra notes 208-11 (discussing the Busher direc­
tive to compare RICO forfeiture sentences and sentences under other statutes). 
262. United States v. Lewis, 759 F.2d 1316, 1334 (8th Cir.) (rejecting eighth amend­
ment appeal and upholding defendant's prison sentence), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985). 
The court stated: 
Comparison between sentences under different statutes may be valuable in other 
cases, but not in the CCE context. . .. [T]he elements of the statute recognize 
that a defendant in a CCE case has committed a considerably more severe offense 
than an ordinary drug dealer; in addition to selling drugs, he must occupy a su­
pervisory position and derive substantial income from his enterprise. 
Id. While courts are reluctant to tamper with sentences established by Congress for drug 
law violations, courts are more sympathetic to eighth amendment appeals of sentences for 
non-narcotics violations. See United States v. Garcia, 755 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1985) (using 
Solem analysis to reduce prison sentence for defendant who refused to testify before grand 
jury investigating alleged anti-Castro terrorists); Whitmore v. Maggio, 742 F.2d 230 (5th 
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In United States v. Erwin,263 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit also deferred to the congressional decision "to set 
floors but not ceilings for CCE penalties. "264 The court used the prin­
ciples outlined in Solem to determine that a defendant's sentence was 
severe, but "not unconstitutionally disproportionate to the gravity of 
... [the] offense."265 However, the court did not engage in a lengthy 
analysis comparing other CCE sentences. In affirming the sentences, 
the court noted that the defendant's organization, which "encom­
passed the sale of cocaine to private customers and the passing of 
. counterfeit fifty and hundred [sic] dollar bills,"266 was easily distin­
guishable from the "petty offender" in Solem, who was sentenced to 
the disproportionate term of life in prison without parole. 267 
While other courts have refused to engage in the extensive Solem 
proportionality review,268 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lit­
tlefield has made the detailed Solem guidelines available to any defend­
ant who can show that property forfeited for drug trafficking also had 
a legitimate use.269 This approach, as well as the statutory interpreta­
tion in McKeithen allowing partial forfeiture,270 favors drug entrepre­
neurs subject to economic sanctions over other defendants facing 
severe prison sentences under DAPCA. The uneven application of the 
DAPCA forfeiture statute, using statutory interpretation or routine 
Cir. 1984) (consecutive sentences of 75 and 50 years with no chance of parole for armed 
robberies is cruel and unusual); United States v. Golomb, 754 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1985) (va­
cating $100,000.00 restitution order and 26 year prison sentence for stolen goods dealer 
with no prior criminal record). The restitution order in Golomb was modified and the 
sentence was reduced to 24 years in United States v. Golomb, 811 F.2d 787, 791 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
263. 793 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.) (affirming RICO and CCE convictions for members of a 
narcotics operation fronted by a watermelon farmer), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 589 (1986). 
264. Erwin, 793 F.2d at 669. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. at 659. The Erwin court also noted that the Solem factors were intended as 
"guidelines for appellate courts to consider" when assessing whether a sentence violates the 
eighth amendment. Id. at 668 (emphasis added). In Busher and Littlefield, the appellate 
courts instructed district courts to use the Solem guidelines when sentencing RICO and 
CCE defendants, declining to resolve the issue of disproportionality in the cases at hand. 
267. Id. at 668. 
268. See supra notes 255 and accompanying text for cases rejecting appeal for exten­
sive Solem analysis. 
269. The petty crimes perpetrated by the indigent alcoholic defendant in Solem pro­
vide a useful contrast with the defendant in Littlefield, who was engaged in the business of 
wholesale marijuana cultivation. In Solem, the punishment of life in prison without parole 
was truly disproportionate; while the forfeiture in Littlefield was well suited to the defend­
ant's drug law violations. See text accompanying supra notes 134-35 for a description of 
punishment imposed on defendant in Solem, and note 248 for a description of Littlefield's 
marijuana farming operation. 
270. See supra notes 24J-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of McKeithen. 
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application of the Solem eighth amendment factors, may result in a 
patchwork of partial forfeitures, making uniform sentencing under the 
DAPCA statute impossible. 




Appellate courts have a duty to insure that the RICO statute is 
not used to obtain convictions and forfeitures which are disproportion­
ate to the crimes committed, and which violate the eighth amend­
ment.271 This review of a RICO forfeiture appeal involves an 
evaluation of trial court evidence on two levels. First, to determine 
whether the conviction conforms to the substantive requirements of 
the RICO statute. Second, to determine whether the conviction con­
forms to the eighth amendment and results in a forfeiture which is 
roughly proportional to the RICO violations. There are overlapping 
criteria inherent in these two levels of review. 
A. Statutory Review ofSubstantive RICO Convictions 
The first phase of this appellate review process, the statutory re­
view, uses the RICO statutes and case law as guidelines to determine 
whether the prosecution was proper. An examination of the trial 
court record will reveal whether the government has proven that the 
defendant committed the predicate offenses involving a pattern of 
racketeering activity.272 The record must also prove that the defend­
ant used the enterprise to be forfeited in connection with the RICO 
271. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text (discussing the eighth amend­
ment protection against disproportionate economic penalties). "Mast prosecutorial discre­
tion in combination with potentially enormous forfeiture orders might in some 
circumstances threaten Eighth Amendment rights." United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 
1235, 1251 (7th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Littlefield, 821 F.2d 1365, 1368 (9th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Busher, 817 F.2d 1409, 1413-16 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983». "[A] forfeiture may 
conflict with the eighth amendment when the amount forfeited bears no relationship to the 
magnitude of a Defendant's racketeering activity. If such a situation arises, it is most likely 
to arise where the asset subject to forfeiture bears no relation to the racketeering activity 
which serves as the basis for a RICO conviction." United States v. Horak, 633 F. Supp. 
190, 199 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1986) (citing United States v. Lizza Indus., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d 
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986); United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106 
(3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 
857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983); United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 
1188 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387,397 (2d. Cir. 1979), cert. de­
nied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980». 
272. See supra notes 61-79 and accompanying text (discussing the substantive re­
quirements of §§ 1961-1962). 
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violations.273 The court should examine carefully the evidence and the 
forfeiture order to assure that the forfeiture applies only to property 
with the necessary connection to the defendant's crimes.274 If the de­
fendant has neither conducted a pattern of racketeering activity, 275 nor 
used the forfeited enterprise in connection with the criminal violations, 
then the RICO indictment must be dismissed, and the RICO forfeiture 
vacated.276 
The appeals court can also compare the gravity of the offense 
with the harshness of the forfeiture penalty, in order to detennine 
whether the RICO prosecution was justified.277 For example, a 
loosely connected series of minor violations would not be serious 
enough to satisfy the RICO pattern requirement, making a penalty of 
forfeiture inappropriate.278 If the defendant lacked the intent to com­
mit racketeering acts which violate RICO,279 the RICO conviction 
should be dismissed.280 
273. See supra notes 81-91 and accompanying text (discussing § 1963). 
274. See supra note 83 and accompanying text, discussing the nexus requirement 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1963, and note 53 and accompanying text, explaining that the property 
to be forfeited under § 1963 must be included in the RICO indictment. 
275. United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 921 (2d Cir.) (dismissing indictment 
against defendant convicted of only one predicate act involving Bonanno organized crime 
family), cert. denied. 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States V. Martino, 648 F.2d 367,396 (5th 
Cir. 1981) (defendant cannot be convicted under RICO absent charge and proof of an 
agreement to commit two predicate acts), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 943 (1982); United States 
V. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 907 (5th Cir.) (evidence that the defendant used a close friend as a 
personal source of amphetamines, and that defendant became involved in the sale of meat 
which had been stolen by enterprise, was insufficient to sustain his conviction), cert. denied, 
439 U.S. 953 (1978). 
276. See supra notes 95 and 96 and accompanying text, which discuss FED. R. CRIM. 
P. 29 and 32(a). See also M. PICKHOLZ, S. HORN & J. SIMON, supra note 56, at 93-107 
(defense strategies); 2 F.L. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLAIT, supra note 34, at 469-79. Cj. United 
States V. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir.) (rejecting defendant's argument that RICO 
indictment failed to state a crime against the United States), reh'g denied, 714 F.2d 137 (5th 
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). See supra note 49 for a discussion of Cauble. 
277. This is the first guideline established in Solem V. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 
(1982). See supra notes 139-43 and accompanying text for discussion of Solem guidelines. 
Use of this criterion in this phase of the appellate review illustrates the overlapping nature 
of the statutory and constitutional review of RICO forfeitures. 
278. 18 U.S.c. § 1962 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). See supra notes 71-77 and accompa­
nying text for the § 1962 definition of RICO violations and a discussion of the pattern 
. a
requirement. . 
279. This guideline is stated in Solem, 463 U.S. at 293. 
280. See United States V. Yonan, 622 F. Supp. 721, 724 (N.D. Ill. E.D. 1985) (sus­
taining RICO indictment but dismissing one count because defendant had no reasonable 
way to anticipate that conduct charged would be criminal), aff'd in part. rev'd in part, 800 
F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert' denied, 107 S. Ct. 930 (1987); United States V. Ragonese, 607 
F. Supp. 649, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (defendant's interest in apartment not forfeitable since 
defendant did not use the apartment to further RICO enterprise, and .attempted to stop use 
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A RICO conviction which fails to satisfy the requirements of the 
statute should be reversed. This statutory review of the RICO convic­
tion and forfeiture would usually result in the vacatur of dispropor­
tionate forfeitures before the court ever reaches the constitutional 
question of compliance with the eighth amendment's prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.281 
B. Constitutional Review of the RICO Forfeiture Order 
An appellate court's review of compliance with the RICO statute 
leads naturally to a review of the constitutionality of a RICO forfei­
ture order. This second phase of review of a RICO forfeiture appeal 
uses the eighth amendment concepts outlined in Solem v. Helm as a 
guideline for determining whether the forfeiture is roughly propor­
tional to the defendant's crimes and whether it violates the eighth 
amendment's protection against disproportionate sentences.282 The 
Solem principles are useful in reviewing RICO forfeiture cases where 
legitimate property interests are intertwined with criminal enterprises. 
However, the Solem concepts cannot be used to create a partial forfei­
ture of the defendant's property, as contemplated by the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decision in Busher. A Solem review of a RICO for­
feiture must be undertaken within the context of "rough proportional­
ity" outlined in United States v. Huber.283 The Huber court stated 
of apartment for drug sales), aff'd, 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986). Cj. United States v. 
Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983) (rejecting appeal of RICO conviction and 
forfeiture and rejecting argument defendant lacked intent to defraud banks), reh'g denied, 
714 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984). 
281. As the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated in United States v. Horak, 833 
F.2d 1235, 1241 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987), "[W]e think it highly unlikely that criminal forfeiture 
orders properly entered under [section 1961) (a)(l) reaching proceeds of racketeering activ­
ity could constitute cruel and unusual punishment violating the Eighth Amendment." See 
supra note 87 for a discussion of the Horak court's holding, which improperly vacated part 
of a RICO forfeiture on statutory grounds. See also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,289-90 
(1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263,272 (1980). 
282. This appellate court review is distinguished from the extensive proportionality 
analysis which the district court was instructed to undertake in Busher. 
283. 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980). While 
affirming the punitive purpose of RICO, the Huber court sustained a district court's "con­
ditional" forfeiture order, which allowed the defendant to redeem his business interests 
upon payment to the Attorney General of $l00,oop.OO. The court declared that it would 
permit such an adjustment if legitimate and criminal aspects of the defendant's enterprise 
had been commingled, and the forfeiture would be disproportionate to the defendant's 
crimes. Id. The Huber court interpreted § 1963 as allowing the district court such discre­
tion. Id. at 397. At that time § 1963(c) stated: 
Upon conviction of a person under this section, the court shall authorize the At­
torney General to seize all property or other interest declared forfeited under this 
section upon such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper. 
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that the concept of "rough proportionality" is built into the RICO 
statute because "the provision for forfeiture is keyed to the magnitude 
of a defendant's criminal enterprise."284 
18 U.S.C. § 1963(c) (1982). However, subsequent to the Huber decision, this section was 
clarified and amended by The Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA), included in The Com­
prehensive Crime Control Act ot 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 302, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) 
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1963(h) (Supp. IV 1985). CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH LAW SER­
VICE, Bill Digest of Public General Bills and Resolutions, 98th Congo 2d Sess. 219. This 
amendment took the power of adjusting forfeiture orders away from the courts. See supra 
note 97 for text of § 1963(h) and court decisions affirming that Attorney General has sole 
authority to limit forfeitures. 
Additionally, an amendment to the RICO forfeiture law, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(f), specifi­
cally prohibits reacquisition by the defendant of property he or she has forfeited. Section 
1963(f) states that following seizure of forfeited property: 
Any property right or interest not exercisable by, or transferrable for value to, the 
United States shall expire, and not revert to the defendant, nor shall the defend­
ant, or any person acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant be eligible 
to purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the United States. 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(f) (Supp. IV 1986). By enacting this amendment, Congress expressly 
eliminated the Huber court's interpretation of RICO as allowing conditional forfeiture and 
redemption of forfeited property by a defendant. Despite this amendment, the Ninth Cir­
cuit Court of Appeals declared in Busher that a trial court could still use the Huber remedy 
of conditional forfeiture, with redemption available to the defendant if an extensive dispro­
portionality review determined that the foIfeiture was disproportionate under the eighth 
amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Busher, 817 F.2d at 1416,1416 
n.13. The Busher court stated that a trial court could limit a forfeiture order using the 
Solem principles, or condition a RICO forfeiture "upon payment of such sum or relinquish­
ment of such other property as seems just under the circumstances." Id. at 1416. 
284. Huber, 603 F.2d at 397. See also United States V. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026 (4th 
Cir.), cen. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980). In Grande, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed with the Huber view that RICO "is not cruel and unusual" because "[t]he magni­
tude of the [RICO] forfeiture is directly keyed to the magnitude of the defendant's interest 
in the enterprise conducted in violation of law." Id. at 1039. 
The defendants in Grande, demolition contractors and a former Baltimore city official, 
were convicted of bid rigging. They claimed that RICO violates the article III prohibition 
against harsh forfeitures for treason (U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2: "no Attainder of 
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person 
attainted."), as well as a statute enacted by the First Congress which forbade total disinher­
itance. This supplementary statute stated that "no conviction or judgment shall work cor­
ruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate." 1 Stat. 113, 117 (1790), codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3563 (1982). This statute was repealed by Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, C. II § 212(a)(2), 
October 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 1987, effective November 1, 1986, pursuant to § 235 of Pub. L. 
No. 98-472. 
The court rejected this constitutional challenge of RICO's broad forfeiture provisions, 
concluding that article III of the Constitution, and the supplementary statute enacted by 
the First Congress, were designed to prevent the government from imposing forfeiture pro­
visions more broad than those established by RICO. 
In rejecting the appeal, the Grande court also stated that "the law has always recog­
nized the constitutional validity of forfeiture of the instruments of the crime." Grande, 620 
F.2d at 1039 (citing Calero-Toledo V. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (in 
rem forfeiture of yacht was not an unconstitutional taking, because yacht owner did not do 
all it could to avoid having its property put to unlawful use), and United States V. United 
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The appellate court must examine the trial court record in order 
to weigh the magnitude of the defendant's criminal activity against the 
value of property to be forfeited. By reviewing the trial court evi­
dence, the appellate court is able to deal with the possibility of dispro­
portionate forfeitures and potential abuse of RICO by the government, 
while remaining faithful to the punitive purpose of RICO forfeiture. 28s 
As it begins the eighth amendment review, the appellate court 
already has compared the gravity of the defendant's offense with the 
severity of the sentence during its review of statutory compliance 
under RICO.286 However, another consideration established in Solem 
which may not have been considered, the magnitude of a defendant's 
crime, may also be relevant in determining whether a forfeiture is 
roughly proportional.287 If these comparisons reveal that the defend­
ant has been convicted of only minor and insignificant violations 
which are not roughly proportional to the RICO sentence, the forfei­
ture should be vacated.288 The appeals court need not engage in de­
tailed comparisons with other sentences and other jurisdictions, as 
outlined in the second and third prongs of the Solem analysis.289 Ex-
States Coin and Currency, 401 u.s. 715 (1970». See also United States v. Thevis, 474 F. 
Supp. 134, 140-41 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (neither the constitution nor 18 U.S.C. § 3563 bars 
limited forfeiture of property used to violate criminal law), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), 
reh'g denied, 671 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1982), cerr. denied, 456 U.S. 1008 (1982). 
285. See United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1982). In Tunnell, the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the Huber concept of "rough proportionality," and 
the view that a RICO forfeiture is constitutional when "'keyed to the magnitude of a 
defendant's criminal enterprise.''' Id. at 1188 (quoting United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 
387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979».' The defendant in Tunnell was convicted under RICO for bribing 
law enforcement officials in order to protect a prostitution business operated at the Pines 
Motel, in Kilgore, Texas. Tunnell, 667 F.2d at 1184. On appeal, Tunnell claimed the total 
forfeiture of his motel was disproportionate and violated the eighth amendment. 
The Tunnell court examined evidence which established "that Tunnell operated the 
Pines Motel as a place of prostitution during the entire period of his ownership and cor­
rupted local officials to maintain his business ...." Id. at 1188. The court rejected the 
defendant's eighth amendment proportionality appeal, concluding that the district court 
was required to order forfeiture of the motel and that the evidence demonstrated the forfei­
ture was proportional to the offense and did not violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 1188. 
The court stated that "Tunnell's interest in the Pines Motel and its acquisition and mainte­
nance and use in violation of RICO were facts determined by the jury ...." Id. 
286. See supra notes 272-81 and accompanying text for deScription of statutory re­
view of RICO conviction. 
287. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 293 (1982). 
288. Cf supra note 166 (Sentencing Memorandum explaining the serious damages 
caused by Busher's crimes). 
289. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (explaining that comparisons of 
other sentences and forfeitures are not meaningful), and note 217 (explaining the analysis of 
Lizza Industries, which rejected the notion that detailed comparisons are needed in RICO 
forfeiture appeals). 
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tensive comparisons would only confuse the review of RICO forfeiture 
sentences. 
A detailed comparison with other RICO forfeiture orders also is 
unnecessary because the appellate court has no power to revise or 
amend a forfeiture. Congress did not authorize courts to craft forfei­
ture orders to match the nature of the violation in each case.29O It 
could have done so, but did not. Instead, Congress established special 
statutory programs that mandate total forfeiture, with the penalty im­
posed only in cases where the defendant committed the criminal acts 
needed to obtain a conviction.291 Trial court judges have no power to 
allow the convicted defendant to retain part of an enterprise found to 
be forfeitable under RICO.292 The trial court must enter a judgment 
of total forfeiture upon a jury's finding that the defendant used his or 
her property to promote racketeering.293 The role of the federal dis­
trict courts is limited under RICO to entry of judgment of the total 
forfeiture, or judgment of acquittal with vacatur of total forfeiture 
sentences which do not fit the requirements of the RICO statute.294 
The traditional appellate remedy will effectively eliminate dispropor­
tionate forfeiture judgments entered by the district courts, thus dis­
couraging any prosecutorial abuse of the statute.29S 
290. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text (explaining that RICO forfeiture 
is mandatory under 18 U.S.c. § 1963). 
291. See supra notes 53-97 and accompanying text (discussing RICO forfeiture 
mechanism). 
292. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text, discussing court decisions hold­
ing that RICO forfeitures cannot be amended by the courts, and supra note 87, discussing 
statutory clarification which forecloses reacquisition of forfeited property by convicted 
RICO defendants. 
293. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text, discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1963 and 
the total forfeiture provisions of RICO. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(b) which states: "[w]hen 
a verdict contains a finding of property subject to criminal forfeiture, the judgment of crim­
inal forfeiture shall authorize the Attorney General to seize the interest or property subject 
to forfeiture, fixing such terms and conditions as the court shall deem proper." Statutes 
now foreclose any terms and conditions which would allow reacquisition of forfeited prop­
erty by RICO defendants. See supra note 283 (discussing Congressional clarification of 
judicial role in carrying out forfeiture orders). 
294. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 29, 
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal). However, if the RICO indictment is dismissed and the 
forfeiture vacated, the defendant's convictions and sentences under other statutes may still 
be upheld. See. e.g.• supra note 152 (explaining that Busher was convicted and sentenced 
for violating four statutes in addition to RICO). 
295. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing FED. R. CRIM. P. 
32(a)(2), Notification of Right to Appeal). One study of 236 RICO indictments concluded 
that "RICO has not been frequently abused in application ... it has served a valuable 
function by permitting prosecutors to avoid some serious gaps in the federal penal code 
...." Lynch, supra note 52, at 984. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals improperly ordered an ex­
tensive eighth amendment analysis in the case of United States v. 
Busher. Trial evidence established that the defendant used his busi­
ness in a pattern of racketeering activity; and that the RICO prosecu­
tion was proper.296 Comparable RICO cases have upheld total 
forfeiture, rejecting eighth amendment claims that forfeiture of a cor­
rupted business would be "disproportionate" and "cruel and unu­
sual."297 Yet the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the trial 
evidence in Busher, failed to determine whether the appellant's eighth 
amendment claim was valid, and remanded the case with instructions 
that the district court consider imposing a partial forfeiture. 
In enacting the RICO statute, Congress intended to impose the 
penalty of total forfeiture on corrupted organizations, including busi­
ness enterprises corrupted by white-collar crime.298 The Busher 
court's directive to measure the degree of a defendant's intent, and to 
limit the forfeiture accordingly, is contrary to the RICO statute and 
should not be followed. 
Additionally, the statute did not give courts the authority to allo­
cate taint to a defendant's assets, or to mete out partial forfeitures. 299 
Partial forfeitures never were intended under the RICO statute, and 
could not be administered evenly by the courts because of the wide 
variations among predicate offenses and property to be forfeited. By 
attempting to allocate taint to portions of a defendant's property, the 
Busher court attempts to apply in rem forfeiture concepts to the RICO 
forfeiture statute, which is in personam.300 Busher undermines the 
congressional intent to divest racketeers and white-collar criminals of 
profits and the enterprises which they control. 30\ 
Courts have also consistently rejected eighth amendment appeals 
brought by defendants sentenced to severe prison sentences under 
RICO and the parallel sentencing statutes of the Drug Abuse Preven­
tion and Control Act (DAPCA).302 If courts cond~ct extensive pro­
296. See supra notes 152-172 and accompanying text. 
297. See supra notes 230, 283-84 and accompanying text. 
,298. See supra notes 28-52 and accompanying text for discussion of RICO's legisla­
tive history. 
299. See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's lack 
of discretion to mete out partial forfeitures. 
300. See supra notes 89-91 (distinguishing in rem and in personam forfeiture). 
301. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text, discussing the congressional in­
tent to separate defendants from ownership of corrupted enterprises. 
302. See supra notes 145 and 255 for eighth amendment appeals of RICO and 
DAPCA sentences affecting liberty rights. 
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portionality reviews in future forfeiture cases, and adjust the economic 
sentences imposed under the RICO forfeiture provisions, RICO will 
become an ineffective mechanism for punishing and deterring white­
collar crime, and white-collar offenders will regain their favored status 
over persons sentenced to prison for other crimes.303 
John L. Roberts 
303. See supra notes 40-52, explaining that punishment for white-collar crime was 
formerly ineffective and disproportionate to other crimes in the years before RICO became 
a widely used tool against white-collar crime. 
